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ABSTRACT
In an address to the 9/11 symposium Terror In the Ai, and in a
postscript which assesses the first mass smallpox immunization
since the New York City Board of Health vaccinated 6.4 million in
April 1947, Professor Conk examines a vaccination program that
was unique in public health history. While the disease has been
eradicated and no one is known to be at risk of infection, it is possi-
ble that scientific research stocks of the virus could be misappropri-
ated, and the virus used as a weapon. The threat of a smallpox attack
is unascertainable. There may be no benefit from vaccination, but
there is danger to some in vaccination with the live vaccinia virus
vaccine. Driven by a post-9/11 fear that the unthinkable may occur,
the federal government has pressed for, and obtained, a reversal of
the three-decade-old policy of non-vaccination against variola - the
smallpox virus.
The government recently began a program in which it intended to
vaccinate at first 500,000 volunteer health workers in the first stage,
and eventually a total of 10 million. The President promised to vac-
cinate any civilian requesting it. But in the first 8 months of the ci-
vilian program led by the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
(CDC) only 38,000 volunteered. Furthermore, the Department of
Defense (DoD) has vaccinated half a million soldiers and civilian
employees who were required to submit to the measure.
Compensation programs and estimates of the adverse health effects
of a resumed smallpox vaccination program were intensely debated.
* Adjunct Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Part-
ner, Tulipan & Conk, P.C., South Orange, NJ; Elected Member,
American Law Institute. Valuable research assistance for this article
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A very spare program of civilian compensation for such adverse ef-
fects was enacted. Few civilians volunteered and few were injured.
Civilian public health and military medical units cooperated in active
surveillance of the sequellae associated with the administration of
the vaccinia live virus Dryvax smallpox vaccine. Previously unrec-
ognized post-vaccination complications, such as myocarditis and
pericarditis, were soon observed. Early identification of the possible
cardiac hazard was followed by promulgation of new clinical guide-
lines excluding volunteers deemed to be at particular risk for such
illnesses.
The conduct of the military program was exemplary in its com-
mitment to the study of adverse health effects of vaccination. The
military also cooperated superbly with public health authorities, ena-
bling prompt adjustments to the protocols and exclusions by relying
on the comprehensive database of the Defense Medical Surveillance
System.
An important environmental effect of September 11, 2001 may be
an epidemic of fear, which spurred government officials to make an
alarmist assessment of the risks posed by bio-weapons and to down-
play the risks of the proposed mass-vaccination program. The civil-
ian vaccination program later faltered because of alarm about re-
ported complications, uncertainty regarding compensation for those
who fell ill, and the fact that no present risk could be identified.
Lessons were learned which can help improve our ability to re-
spond to unexpected microbial outbreaks - whether natural or inten-
tional. We now have trained military and civilian smallpox vaccina-
tion teams, as well as a large pool of vaccinees in the armed ser-
vices.. This experience may help us to develop a more effective and
comprehensive emergency preparedness public health network. Ide-
ally, such a plan will ready us for all sudden infectious disease out-
breaks, while reducing or eliminating the burden of preemptive vac-
cination for such remote possibilities as the use of weaponized
smallpox virus.
INTRODUCTION
As the speakers and the downtown residents present at the "Terror
in the Air" Symposium displayed, the ground beneath our feet, the
air we breathe, and the water we drink can no longer be taken for
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granted since September 11, 2001. On that day the 201h century, a
century of total war I yielded to the 21Stcentury, a century of war
anywhere, anytime. There is nothing new about the bombing of cit-
ies. Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Tokyo all suffered attacks
warranting the description of "terror. ,2 The Cold War was fought
based on the assumption that peace could only be maintained by a
balance of terror, a stabilizing effect of mutually assured destruc-
tion.3
September 11, 2001 was different. Ground Zero was not a nuclear
target zone, but a pile of rubble where thousands of innocent civil-
ians had gone to work that morning. The terror did not come from
state actors, but from a lawless force unconstrained by the elements
that had made the nuclear standoff between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. seem predictable, even if periodically harrowing.
4
Underscoring the message of vulnerability was the sense that the
most ordinary of objects could herald the approach of danger. There
followed a series of anonymous anthrax attacks, in which 22 were
infected. Ten thousand people were placed on prophylactic antibiot-
ics.5 Upon identifying anthrax in 1876, Robert Koch and Louis Pas-
1. See RAYMOND ARON, THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR (1954)
(describing the 2 0 th century as the century of total war).
2. See RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 169 (Richard Howard & Annette B. Fox
trans., 1996) (1966) (using the term "terror" to describe the "bomb-
ing of cities"); see also GAR ALPEROVITZ, ATOMIC DIPLOMACY:
HIROSHIMA AND POTSDAM - THE USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB AND
THE AMERICAN CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIET POWER (1967). Not
only Japan's wartime rulers, but also the leaders of the Soviet Union,
were the "targets" of the atomic bombing of the Japanese cities. Id.
3. See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: SOLDIER AND
PRESIDENT 338 (1990). The former scientific head of the Manhattan
Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer, described the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.,
the two Cold War Adversaries, as "scorpions in a bottle." Id.
4. See STROBE TALBOTT, THE MASTER OF THE GAME: PAUL
NITZE AND THE NUCLEAR PEACE (1988); DAVID HOLLOWAY, STALIN
AND THE BOMB: THE SOVIET UNION AND ATOMIC ENERGY, 1939 -
1956 (1994).
5. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Update: Investigation of Bioterror-
20031
442 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
teur had hailed their discovery as bringing "within the power of man
to rid himself of every parasitic disease." However, now anthrax is
a threat that arrives by mail, in a plain white envelope. Similarly, the
air in the subway tunnels and in the post office seem less secure.
New York and the nation will never be the same. The National Insti-
tute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institute of
Health has declared "bioterrorism" to be a "clear and present dan-
ger.' ' 7 We now face the "problem of biosecurity in an age of bioter-
rorism.
''
ism-Related Anthrax, 2001, 50 No. 45 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 1008 (Nov. 16, 2001).
Since November 7, 2001, CDC and state and local public
health agencies have identified no new cases of bioterror-
ism-related anthrax. As of November 14, a total of 22
cases of anthrax has met the CDC case definition; 10
were confirmed inhalational anthrax, and 12 (seven con-
firmed and five suspected) were cutaneous anthrax.
Id. See also, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Evaluation of Postexposure
Antibiotic Prophylaxis to Prevent Anthrax, 51 No. 3 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 59 (Jan. 25, 2002).
6. SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH 180
(1994).
7. H. Clifford Lane, John La Montagne & Anthony S. Fauci,
Bioterrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, 7 NATURE MED. 1271
(2001).
8. See Gigi Kwik, Joe Fitzgerald, Thomas V. Inglesby & Tara
O'Toole, Biosecurily: Responsible Stewardship of Bioscience in an
Age of Catastrophic Terrorism, 1 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, SCI. & PRAC. 1, at 27-35 (2003). The prob-
lem includes the "Persephone effect" - the danger that the life sci-
ences will be employed on the dark side - designing for death, rather
than life. Id. Explaining its mission, the leaders of the Johns Hop-
kins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies write that in the life
sciences we must assure a "responsible stewardship in an age of
catastrophic terrorism." Id. The problem is "how to constrain malig-
nant applications of powerful bioscience responsibility without dam-
aging the generation of essential knowledge." Id.
In the aftermath of the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the
terrorist assaults on the World Trade Towers, policymak-
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This essay was presented early in the vaccination program, in
March 2003, and has been supplemented by a postscript assessing
the experience of the first smallpox vaccination campaign since the
eradication of the disease among human populations and its con-
signment to research stocks.
In Part I, the threat and scenarios for the unquantifiable - indeed
unidentifiable - risk of attack are described. Part II describes the
disease, the vaccine countermeasure and the estimated health risks to
vaccinees receiving the live vaccinia virus vaccine now adminis-
tered. In Part III, the compensation options are explored - including
the immunity granted to manufacturers and vaccinators by the
Homeland Security Act, which limits claimants to the remedy
against the United States provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Possible tort claims are briefly discussed, followed by an examina-
tion of alternatives to tort claims. The probable, although uncertain,
availability of workers' compensation as a remedy for vaccine-
related injury is addressed. Legislative no-fault compensation meas-
ures proposed by Congress are also described. The discussion fo-
cuses on the Democratic minority's proposal to add the smallpox
vaccine to the products covered by the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Compensation Act; while the Republican majority pursued a
more limited supplemental remedy, patterned after the Public Ser-
vice Officers Benefit Program administered by the U.S. Department
of Justice.
ers awakened to these inherent powers of biological re-
search and began calling for more governmental controls.
The Patriot Act (2001) (footnote omitted) and the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Re-
sponse Act of 2002 (footnote omitted) imposed new
regulations on the conduct of research involving "select
agents" - the several dozen pathogens that the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention judges to be the most
dangerous potential biological weapons. In recent
months, the White House Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy has met with representatives of professional
science societies, private industry, and others to discuss
restricting access to "sensitive homeland security infor-
mation" generated within government.
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Part IV, a postscript, notes the apparent overstatement of the risk
of chemical and biological weapons in the pre-war assessments as
the nation prepared for the war to remove Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq. The experience of the military and civilian smallpox
vaccination programs is assessed. Far fewer civilians than expected
- 38,000 total - actually stepped forward to be vaccinated. Health
data on civilians showed a lower rate of observed complications than
historical data had led public health authorities to expect. The mili-
tary vaccination program - which principally reached the unvacci-
nated - also showed lower than historical rates of disease. However,
that program also showed an unexpected increase in the cardiac in-
flammatory conditions called myocarditis and pericarditis.
The active surveillance by military and civilian authorities must be
commended. The program, although one may argue it was inspired
by a panicky post-9/l1 overstatement of the risk, is to be com-
mended for demonstrating the direction necessary to better prepare
for microbial outbreaks. Following the suggestions of the National
Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine, an end to the civilian
vaccination program, and a more nearly adequate compensation pro-
gram are recommended.
I. SMALLPOX - THE THREAT
In 1999 in the new edition of the leading medical school textbook
on vaccines began its chapter on smallpox saying "smallpox is now a
disease of historical interest only, its eradication having been certi-
fied by the World Health Organization on May 8, 1980." 9 Its distin-
guished author, Dr. Donald Henderson, then Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Health and Science in the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, was celebrating a public health triumph
for which he had long labored: the death of a virus - variola - which
had plagued human existence since 10,000 B.C.E. The Egypt of the
pharaohs, ancient Athens, the Chinese empire of the fourth century
C.E., India, and Europe all suffered from the disease.' 0 Mankind's
9. Donald A. Henderson & Bernard Moss, Smallpox and Vac-
cinia, in VACCINES 13 (Stanley A. Plotkin & Edward A. Mortimer,
Jr., eds., 3d ed. 1999).
10. See id.
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labor to eradicate the disease succeeded. The last known case was
reported in 1977."1
By 1999, Dr. Henderson, then director of the Johns Hopkins Cen-
ter for Civilian Biodefense Studies, was worried about the security
of one of the two known research stocks of the virus.1 2 "Smallpox
virus thus exists in Russia, probably at two sites, at least. How se-
cure the stocks may be is uncertain, especially given the economic
conditions in Russia today, and the fact that salaries for scientists are
paid very late or not at all. Many have left their former institutions
for other countries. Reasonable evidence exists that at least ten na-
tions are now engaged in the development of bioweapons and some
are actively recruiting scientists in Russia."'
' 3
In June 2001 the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
[ACIP] of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]
described the use of "smallpox virus as a biological weapon" as less
likely than other biological agents because of its "restricted" avail-
ability. The ACIP recommended only surveillance by the CDC of
11. See id.
12. The World Health Organization campaigned for the destruc-
tion of the known stocks of the organism. See Lawrence K. Altman,
Health Group Votes to Kill Last Viruses of Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1996, at A4. Destruction was scheduled for June 30, 1999.
Id. The last stocks of variola are kept frozen in laboratories at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and the Rus-
sian State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology in
Koltsovo. Id. The Clinton Administration finally decided against
destruction of the U.S. supply, relying on a report by the Institute of
Medicine, part of the National Academy of Sciences, which found
that the complex DNA of the ancient virus was a valuable research
subject. Judith Miller & William J. Broad, Clinton to Announce that
U.S. Will Keep Sample of Lethal Smallpox Virus, Aides Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at A12. Dr. Henderson, who led the campaign
to destroy the virus sample found the decision "very regrettable:"
"Of all the potential organisms that might be used in bioterrorism,
this is probably the most formidable, and I think we should do every-
thing we possibly can to mitigate against the risk of that virus being
released at any time in any way." Id.
13. Donald Henderson, MD, MPH, Bioterrorism: Myths and Re-
alities, Calderone Lecture, Columbia University School of Public
Health, April 5, 1999.
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any suspected case, and "post release vaccination" of anyone "ex-
posed to the initial release" or who came in close contact with or was
likely to contact infectious materials or clinical specimens "[i]f an
intentional release of smallpox (variola) virus does occur."' 14
Those recommendations were not long-lived. The CDC asked the
ACIP to reconsider its position due to the events that had occurred in
the fall of 2001. In June 2002, Draft Supplemental Recommenda-
tions of the ACIP declared that "the risk for smallpox occurring as a
result of a deliberate release is considered low, and the population at
risk for such an exposure cannot be determined."' 15 However, ACIP
14. ADVISORY COMM. ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES & CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
Vaccinia (Smallpox) Vaccine, Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2001, 50 No. RR-10
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1 (June 22, 2001),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr50l0
al.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter ACIP Recommenda-
tions].
15. A Rand Corporation Study postulated the following attack
scenarios:
Hoax - An activist obtains monkeypox under false pretenses
from a laboratory-supply company and mails it with a threatening
letter to a clinic in a city of 500,000 people. The nation is alarmed
when field tests are positive for poxvirus, and health officials elect to
vaccinate 25 health care workers and patients at the clinic. Luckily,
no infections occur.
Laboratory release - A Biosafety Level 4 hood malfunctions,
probably because of sabotage, in a metropolitan area of 4 million
people. A previously vaccinated laboratory technician contracts a
mild case of modified smallpox, but his two children become quite
ill and infect others.
Human vectors - Three persons residing in a U.S. border city
of 4 million people infect themselves with variola smuggled into a
neighboring country by separatist radicals from their homeland and
then return to the United States. They become only moderately ill,
since they were vaccinated in the 1970s. As in the 1947 outbreak in
New York City, they use the mass transit system while ill, coming
into contact with many persons, and each infects five other persons.
Building attack - A rogue nation produces variola major virus
from samples stealthily acquired during the worldwide eradication
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campaign and makes a preparation available to terrorists for "test-
ing." A U.S. resident, who obtained the agent during training abroad,
aerosolizes the liquid and sprays it into the ventilation system of a
federal office building in a city of about 6 million people. Hundreds
of workers and visitors are heavily exposed; some 350 are infected.
Low- and high-impact airport attacks - In response to mili-
tary actions threatening their regime, a nation's leaders activate 40
"sleeper" agents and instruct them to retrieve variola virus previ-
ously sent to the United States in a container ship. These agents go
to the 10 largest U.S. airports during busy periods and distribute vi-
rus throughout the domestic terminals, using nebulizers. Up to
200,000 people are in the terminals during those times. In the low-
impact case, they infect 5000 persons; in the high impact case, they
infect 100,000 persons.
The researchers concluded:
Vaccination of contacts plus isolation is expected to re-
sult in 7 deaths (from vaccine or smallpox) in a scenario
involving the release of variola virus from a laboratory,
19 deaths in a human-vector scenario, 300 deaths in a
building-attack scenario, 2,735 deaths in a scenario in-
volving a low-impact airport attack, and 54,728 deaths in
a scenario involving a high-impact airport attack. Imme-
diate vaccination of the public in an attacked region
would provide little additional benefit. Prior vaccination
of health care workers, who would be disproportionately
affected, would save lives in large local or national at-
tacks but would cause 25 deaths nationally. Prior vacci-
nation of health care workers and the public would save
lives in a national attack but would cause 482 deaths na-
tionally. The expected net benefits of vaccination depend
on the assessed probability of an attack. Prior vaccina-
tion of health care workers would be expected to save
lives if the probability of a building attack exceeded 0.22
or if the probability of a high-impact airport attack ex-
ceeded 0.002. The probability would have to be much
higher to make vaccination of the public life-saving.
Samuel A. Bozzette, Rob Boer, Vibha Bhaunagar, Jennifer L.
Brower, Emmett B. Keeler, Sally C. Morton, & Michael A. Stoto, A
Model for a Smallpox-Vaccination Policy, NEW ENG. J. MED. 348,
416 (Jan. 30, 2003).
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now recommended "pre-release vaccination of selected groups to
enhance smallpox response readiness."'
' 6
The target groups were proposed federal, state, and local "small-
pox response teams".' 7  Smallpox vaccination would be imple-
mented "for persons pre-designated by the appropriate bioterrorism
and public health authorities to conduct investigation and follow-up
of initial smallpox cases that would necessitate direct patient con-
tact." 8 These teams would include medical team leaders, public
health advisors, epidemiologists, disease investigators, laboratory
scientists, nurses, vaccinators, and security/law enforcement person-
nel.' 9
The White House embraced the plan. On December 13, 2002
President George W. Bush announced that the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) would work with state and local gov-
ernments to form "volunteer Smallpox Response Teams.. .(who) will
be asked to volunteer to receive the smallpox vaccine., 20 President
Bush also announced that the Department of Defense "will vacci-
nate" military and civilian personnel who "are or may be deployed in
high threat areas."
21
Though the President anticipated 500,000 non-military vaccinees,
the project had an unexpectedly slow start as "hundreds of hospitals
and thousands of nurses across the country" declined to participate,
16. ADVISORY COMM. ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES &
HEALTHCARE INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES ADVISORY COMM. &
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, Recommendations for Using Smallpox Vaccine in a Pre-
Event Vaccination Program: Supplemental Recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the
Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee
(HICPAC), 52 RR07 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1
(Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/
vaccination/acip-guidelines.asp (last visited November 7, 2003).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. George W. Bush, Protecting Americans: Smallpox Vaccina-
tion Program at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/
print/2002213-1.html (Dec. 13, 2002).
21. Id.
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according to a New York Times report in early February 2003.22 By
March 7, 2003, as war in Iraq neared, 16,919 had been vaccinated,
eight thousand of them in the previous two weeks, 23 as the Home-
land Security Department declared a nationwide "amber alert", and
fumbling Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offi-
24
cials prompted a nationwide run on duct tape.
The slow response was due to dissent regarding the necessity of a
shift from the June 2001 ACIP recommendations to the schema of
"pre-release vaccination," 25 and a cautionary approach by public
health authorities such as the National Academy of Sciences' Insti-
tute of Medicine (IOM), and the American Public Health Associa-
tion (APHA). The APHA called for research into a safer vaccine,
and worried that the CDC implementation plan did not provide ade-
quate resources, "including costs derived from monitoring adverse
events, treating complications and training personnel.",2 Further-
more, APHA called for mechanisms "to compensate individuals for
22. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Threats and Responses: Bioterror
Threat; Many Balking At Vaccination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at
Al.
23. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Smallpox Vaccine Adverse Events Among Civil-
ians - United States, March 4-10, 2003, 52 No. 10 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 201 (Mar. 14, 2003).
24. See Cecil Connolly, Smallpox Compensation Proposed,
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2003, at A01; see also CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Smallpox
Vaccine Adverse Events Among Civilians - United States, Feb. 18-24
2003, 52 No. 8 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 156
(Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5208a4.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
25. See Thomas Mack, M.D., M.P.H., A Different View of Small-
pox Vaccination, 348 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 460, 460-63 (2003). "A
terrorist introduction of smallpox could produce a short outbreak of
cases and deaths, but the current vaccination policy will provide lit-
tle protection, and the cost in deaths from vaccine complications will
outweigh any benefit." Id.
26. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASSOC., Policy Statement on Smallpox
Vaccination (EB02-1), at http://www.apha.org/legislative/policy/
smallpox.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
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health care costs incurred as a result of adverse events resulting from
smallpox vaccination."
27
An IOM report expressed concern about the "unknown balance of
risks and benefits" inherent in the CDC program.28 Never before
had a vaccination program been undertaken where there was no
natural threat - only the hypothetical threat posed by the possibility
of a terrorist attack. While the likelihood of attack could not be pre-
dicted, the rate of occurrence of adverse side effects from vaccina-
tion could be calculated. In its first report to the CDC, the IOM
called for a slower approach, and careful monitoring of adverse ef-
fects: "[A]t a minimum ... the CDC [should] develop and commu-
nicate the criteria (e.g., types and rates of adverse reactions) that
would trigger a reconsideration of the current systems in place to
protect vaccinees and their contacts (e.g., the October 2002 Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations on
contraindications, screening, care of the vaccination site, and admin-
istrative leave)."29
The IOM warned that without such careful study
...concerns about the financial burden for caring for the
adverse reactions of the smallpox vaccine (and the sober-
ing consideration that some small but real number of vac-
cinees or their contacts could die or suffer permanent dis-
ability subsequent to vaccination) could greatly decrease
the number of people who volunteer for smallpox vacci-
nation. This could seriously impact the program's
achievement of its overall goals of increasing United
States terrorism preparedness. The committee recom-
mends that CDC and the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services support all efforts, some of which might be
administratively or legislatively bold and creative, to
bring this issue of compensation for smallpox vaccine
adverse reactions - including those reactions that occur
27. Id.
28. COMM. ON SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., Review of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Smallpox Vacci-
nation Program Implementation, Letter Report #1, at http://www.
nap.edu/html/smallpox-vac/ltrreport.pdf (Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter IOM Letter Report #1].
29. Id.
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despite nonnegligent manufacture and administration of
the vaccine - to speedy resolution.
30
After a brief discussion of the disease and its history, we will re-
turn to the issue of whether, why, and how we should protect, care
for, and compensate those whom we have asked to volunteer to re-
ceive a live virus vaccine. Volunteering for such a vaccination car-
ries a risk of contracting a serious illness for a small, but unpredict-
able, number of volunteers, as well as those who come into contact
with them.
3 1
II. SMALLPOX: THE DISEASE
Variola virus is the etiological agent of smallpox. It is part of the
family called Pox Virdiae, which includes vaccinia, monkeypox,
cowpox, camelpox, and ectromelia. The first four infect humans.
During the smallpox era, the only known reservoir for the virus was
humans; no known animal or insect reservoirs or vectors existed.
Transmission was person-to-person. The disease was spread via
direct deposit of infective droplets onto the nasal, oral, or pharyngeal
mucosal membranes, or onto the alveoli of the lungs from close con-
tact with an infectious person.
The symptoms of smallpox begin 12 to 14 days after exposure.
They begin with 2 to 3 days prodrome of high fever, malaise, and
prostration with severe headache and backache. This pre-eruptive
stage is followed by the appearance of a distinctive rash, which pro-
gresses to papules 1 to 2 days after the rash appears. Vesicles appear
on the fourth or fifth day; pustules appear by the seventh day; and
30. Id.
31. See Lawrence K. Altman, William J. Broad & Judith Miller,
Smallpox: The Once and Future Scourge, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
1999, at Fl. The United States government last vaccinated infants
for smallpox in 1972. Id. The scourge of smallpox, which is one of
the largest, most highly elaborated viruses known to humankind, was
most dangerous where smallpox was not endemic and natural immu-
nities had not been developed. Id. It is speculated that the highly
contagious disease was spread in the Americas from a slave in the
camp of Spanish conqueror Hernando Cortes, causing the deaths of
3.5 million Aztecs. Id. Today, the fear is sometimes expressed that
"we are all Indians now." Id.
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scab lesions appear on the fourteenth day. During the smallpox era,
overall mortality rates were approximately 30%, though virulence
varied with the particular strain. Smallpox patients are most infec-
tious during the first week of the rash when the oral mucosa lesions
ulcerate and release substantial amounts of virus into the saliva. A
patient is no longer infectious after all scabs have separated (i.e., 3-4
weeks after the onset of the rash).
Today many persons have no immunity, to smallpox. They are
what researchers call "vaccine nafve". Infant vaccination ceased in
the United States in 1972. So no native-born person under the age of
30 was vaccinated as a child, and among those older, little is known
of whether they retain sufficient immunity to fight off smallpox in-
32fection.
The Countermeasure and its Adverse Effects
Smallpox can be effectively prevented by inoculation with the live
vaccinia virus. This measure successfully eradicated the disease
world-wide.33 However, the vaccine is not without risk. The CDC
acknowledges that:
[a]dverse event rates in the United States today may be
higher because there may be more people at risk from 1)
immune suppression from cancer, cancer therapy, organ
transplantation and other illnesses, such as HIV/AIDS,
and 2) eczema or atopic dermatitis. The outcome associ-
ated with adverse events may be less severe than previ-
ously reported because of advances in medical care.
Rates may be lower for persons previously vaccinated.34
32. See Henderson & Moss, Smallpox and Vaccinia, in VACCINES,
supra note 9 (displaying that morbidity and mortality rates vary: the
Asian form of variola had a case-fatality rate of 20%; the African
strain's mortality rate was 20% to 30% less; and the variola minor
strain had a mortality rate of only 1%).
33. See id. at 29.
34. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Smallpox Vaccine: Adverse Event Rates, 1968, 52
No. RR 4:9 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT Table 1
(Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/
vaccine-safety/adverse-events-chart.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
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The CDC has described the historic rate of adverse effects of the
vaccinia vaccination. The three recognized life-threatening reactions
are post-vaccinal encephalitis (2.9/million vaccinees), progressive
vaccinia (0.9/million vaccinees), and eczema vaccinatum
(10.4/million vaccinees). Other adverse events include inadvertent
inoculation and generalized vaccinia, which occurred historically in
the United States at a rate of 25.4 and 23.4/million vaccinees, respec-
tively.
35
35. See id.
(number per million vaccinees)
I NATIONAL SURVEY [TEN STATE SURVEY
All primary Vaccinees > 1 yr old All primary Vaccinees > 1 yr old
(i.e., first-time) (i.e., first-time)
vaccinees vaccinees
Serious, but not
life-threatening
reactions:
InadvertentInoculaton 25.4 27.1 529.2 532.0Inoculation
Generalized 23.4 17.7 241.5 222.8
Vaccinia
Erythema Not Available Not Available 164.6 131.3
Multiforme
Total number of
serious, but not 48.8 935.3*
life-threatening
reactions:
Life-threatening
reactions:
Postvaccinal 2.9 2.4 12.3 8.6
Encephalitis
Progressive
Vaccinia (Vaccinia 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.7
Necrosum)
Eczema
acna 10.4 10.6 38.5 41.5Vaccinatum
Total number of
life-threatening 14.2* 52.3*
reactions:
Deaths: None
Reported
The table above presents smallpox vaccine adverse event rates from
two studies done in 1968 (see references below). Id. The two studies
were carried out using different methodologies. Id. In the national
survey, information was gathered from seven nationwide sources,
with most of the information on adverse reactions coming from the
American Red Cross Vaccinia Immune Globulin (VIG) distribution
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Dr. Kent A. Sepkowitz, of the Infectious Disease Service of Me-
morial Sloan -Kettering Cancer Center, explains that because lesions
caused by the vaccine shed the vaccinia virus, vaccinees may not
only spread the infection to other parts of their bodies (e.g. genitalia
and eyes), but also may pass the virus to persons with whom they
come into close contact (e.g. intimate or face-to-face). Sepkowitz
reports that:
Because of the risk of secondary transmission of vac-
cinia, many hospitals remain uncomfortable with the re-
cent recommendation against the provision of administra-
tive leave for newly vaccinated health care workers.
Also, the advisability of immunocompromised workers'
remaining on the job while colleagues receive vaccine
has not been determined. Until these controversies are
settled, hospitals must be certain that the rush to vacci-
nate health care workers does not result in a self-inflicted
epidemic - not of smallpox, but of infection with the
live, potentially fatal virus, vaccinia.
36
Against this background, we turn to the issues of compensation for
the adverse effects of smallpox vaccination with vaccinia virus - the
only method of inoculation now available.
37
system. Id. Reactions that did not require use of VIG (that is, less
severe reactions) are less likely to be reported through this system.
Id. In the ten-state survey on the other hand, doctors were directly
surveyed to report all adverse reactions, even those considered less
severe. Id. For this reason, the ten-state survey data may present a
better estimate of the number of people having adverse reactions to
the vaccine. Id.
36. Kent A. Sepkowitz, How Contagious is Vaccinia?, 348 N.
ENGL. J. MED. 5, 5 (Jan. 30, 2003).
37. See Andrew Pollack, Company Says It Will Test a Safer
Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at Al. VaxGen, a
California biotech company recently reported that it had acquired the
rights to a Japanese smallpox vaccine it says is safer than the current
vaccine, known as Dry-Vax. Id. It hopes to begin clinical trials this
year. Id. This vaccine is also a live vaccine. Id. The National Insti-
tutes of Health are looking at a strain that is made from a virus called
MVA, which is so weak it is said not to have the capacity to repli-
cate in humans. Id.
[VOL. XIV
SMALLPOX VACCINATION
III. COMPENSATION OPTIONS
The principal health effects of the smallpox vaccination program
will fall on health care workers, police, fire, and defense personnel.
They will accept the risk in response to their employers', and the
government's calls for volunteers. Their patients and household
members of inoculated healthcare workers will be at some risk due
to close contact during the two week infectious stage post-
inoculation. Soldiers will also be subject to the risk of adverse ef-
fects due to mandatory vaccination.
The Homeland Security Act § 304: Immunity for Vaccinators
The Bush Administration first provided immunity from liability.
Section 304 of the Homeland Security Act of 200238 indicates that if
the Secretary of Health and Human Services declares smallpox vac-
cination to be a "countermeasure ... to chemical, biological, radio-
logical, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats," there shall be
immunity from tort liability for "any person who is. . .a manufac-
turer, or distributor," or is a "health care entity under whose auspices
any qualified person who administers the smallpox vaccine.39 Each
such "covered person" shall be deemed to be an employee of the
(United States) Public Health Service "with respect to liability aris-
ing out of administration of a covered countermeasure against small-
pox."
4 0
The exclusive tort remedy for anyone injured by a "countermea-
sure"'4 is prescribed via the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).42 The
38. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
39. Id.
40. Id. at (p).
41. Id.
42. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Compensation for Vacci-
nation Induced Injuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 169 (1986).
There is precedent for this measure in the Swine Flu Act. Id. The
impending outbreak of vaccinia would not be the first self-imposed
epidemic of vaccine-related injuries. Id. In 1976, fearing a massive
winter epidemic of Swine Flu, the government began a campaign to
vaccinate people for the dangerous strain. Id. Ultimately, 40 million
were vaccinated. Id. In some small states the numbers reached 80%
of adults. Id. In larger states, the percentages were much smaller. Id.
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action must be brought against the United States of America.43 Re-
covery shall be predicated on the plaintiffs ability to prove "a negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission" 44 The causal relationship be-
tween vaccinia and the vaccination is a rebuttable presumption.
45
The tort cause of action is unlikely to benefit many persons injured
by the smallpox vaccine. Section 304 serves mainly to immunize
manufacturers, hospitals, and those who administer the vaccine. The
persons most likely to be injured are the public health workers who
administer or receive the smallpox vaccine, or who are infected by
co-workers with whom they come into close contact. If one is in-
fected accidentally by a co-worker (inadvertent inoculation), or if an
immune-compromised worker falls ill due to inadequate warning of
the risks of the smallpox vaccine, a tort action against the co-worker
or employer would be barred by the exclusivity of the workers'
compensation remedy.46
The natural epidemic did not materialize, but an epidemic of vac-
cine-related illness did. Id. 4,000 administrative claims were filed,
resulting in 1,500 federal lawsuits. Id. Approximately, 300 people
were injured by the vaccine-related Guillain-Barr Syndrome. Id. In
response, the Swine Flue Act amended the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412,
2671-2680 (1982). Id. The bill directed all suits be brought against
the United States of America, with the U.S. reserving the right to
seek indemnification from the manufacturers for negligence. Id. A
similar provision is contained in the Homeland Security Act, § 304,
n46, to permit suits against the federal government by those who
might be injured by the vaccine. Id. Manufacturers would be liable
in subsequent indemnification suits by the government, but only if
negligence was proven. Id.
43. See supra note 27; see also 28 U.S.C. 1346 (granting jurisdic-
tion to federal district courts) and 28 U.S.C. 2674 (stating that "[t]he
United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable
for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.").
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2000).
45. See supra note 27.
46. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 100.01 (Desk Ed. 2000) [hereinafter
LARSON'S].
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Where the injury results from carelessness by someone other than
a co-employee or the victim is a household or other close contact of
the vaccinee, there is a possible cause of action against the United
States. Such a cause of action will exist where there was negligence
on the part of the administrator of the vaccine, including instances
where the post-vaccination lesion lacked proper bandage. Claims
may also arise for failure to implement the recommended precau-
tions, for failure to obtain informed consent, or for failure to prop-
erly screen out those for whom smallpox vaccination is contraindi-
cated. Contraindications include a history of eczema or other aller-
gic dermatitis, acute exfoliative skin conditions, immune-
suppression conditions (such as after chemotherapy or testing posi-
tive for HIV), pregnancy or breast-feeding, or allergy to any compo-
nent of the vaccine.
A product liability action against the manufacturer is, of course,
barred by Section 304. Although the United States stands in the
manufacturer's stead, there is little chance of successfully conduct-
ing a product liability action against the United States at the present
time. In almost every jurisdiction the Second Restatement of Torts §
402 A, comment K would be cited for the proposition that an un-
avoidably unsafe but useful product is not defective if it is adminis-
tered with reasonable care, and the patient is given reasonable notice
of the dangers presented by the product (either directly or by inform-
ing the prescribing physician), and the good done by the product
exceeds the harm it causes. 48 49
Once a workers' compensation act has become applicable
either through compulsion or election, it affords the ex-
clusive remedy for the injury by the employee or the em-
ployee's dependents against the employer and insurance
carrier. This is part of the quid pro quo in which the sac-
rifices and gains of employees and employers are to some
extent put in balance, for, while the employer assumes a
new liability without fault, it is relieved of the prospect of
large damage verdicts. Id.
47. See supra note 13, at 9-13.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965).
The comment, in full, reads:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products
which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordi-
20031
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nary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pas-
teur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to
very serious and damaging consequences when it is in-
jected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dread-
ful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine
are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, prop-
erly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably danger-
ous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and
the like, many of which for this very reason cannot le-
gally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescrip-
tion of a physician. It is also true in particular of many
new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack
of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of
purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justi-
fies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products,
again with the qualification that they are properly pre-
pared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.
49. Some courts have construed comment k to be a rule of virtual
immunity for drugs, which are presumed to carry risks that are un-
avoidable. See, e.g. Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751
P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah
1991); Young v. Key Pharms., 922 P.2d 59 (Wisc. 1996) (en banc).
Support for the Brown approach appears to be eroding. See,
e.g. Freeman v. Hoffman LaRoche, 618 N.W. 2d 827 (Neb. 2000)
[Supreme Court overrules McDaniel v. McNeil Labs. Inc., 241
N.W.2d 822 (Neb. 1976), and rejects its previous adherence to the
minority view that a properly manufactured drug accompanied by an
adequate warning of the risks known to the manufacturer at the time
of sale is not defectively designed as a matter of law]. Accord: Bry-
ant v. Hoffman La Roche, 2003 Georgia Lexis 945 (Ga. Ct. App.).
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The live virus smallpox vaccine in current use, which successfully
eradicated a worldwide scourge, undoubtedly would pass the gross
test of product defect enunciated in the Third Restatement's net
benefit rule. But even if the injurious vaccine did not contain a
manufacturing defect, and it was accompanied by adequate warn-
ings, there may yet remain a product liability cause of action. There
is another approach - the reasonable alternative design test which is
the customary approach to proving product design defect regarding
food and other manufactured goods. The essence of the approach
is that an alternative safer design is proposed as the standard against
which the reasonableness of the risks presented by the vaccine
should be measured.
For example, the CDC endorses use of Dryvax "...prepared from
calf lymph with a seed virus derived from the New York City Board
of Health strain of vaccinia... It is a highly effective immunizing
agent that brought about the global eradication of smallpox. Recent
testing has shown that the current vaccine has retained adequate po-
The Nebraska court now embraces the "majority rule" that
applies the comment k defense on a case-by-case basis, believing
that societal interests in ensuring the marketing and development of
prescription drugs will be adequately served without the need to re-
sort to a rule of blanket immunity. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm.
Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993); Hill v. Searle Labs., 884
F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Bank v. Han-
sen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983) (superseded by statute in regard to
blood banks, as recognized in United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827
P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992)); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410
(Colo. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Armentrout v. FMC
Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d
297 (Ida. 1987); Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J.
1984); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I.
1988).
50. The Third Restatement of Torts, Product Liability, §6 (c)
holds that design defect claims can be brought against prescription
drug and medical device manufacturers only if the drug provides no
"net benefit" to any class of users.
51. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 2 (b) pro-
vides that a product is defective if a "reasonable alternative" safer
design was "unreasonably omitted".
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tency during the extended storage period since its production., 52 But
the FDA and others have called for development of alternatives to
Dryvax. There are alternative vaccine design approaches which use
recombinant technology,53 a "defective" virus unable to reproduce,54
or a weaker "attenuated" or "modified" strain, less likely to cause
injury, particularly for children and immune compromised persons.55
52. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, VACCINATION GUIDELINES FOR STATE AND
LOCAL HEALTH AGENCIES: GUIDE B B-7 (June 16, 2002), available
at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/guide-
b-partlof3.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
53. Earl Patricia L; Americo Jeffrey L; Moss Bernard, Develop-
ment and use of a vaccinia virus neutralization assay based on flow
cytometric detection of green fluorescent protein, J Virol 2003 Oct;
77 (19): 10684-8. [A rapid and sensitive neutralization assay is re-
quired to evaluate alternative smallpox vaccines. Here we describe
the development and use of a 96-well plate, semi-automated, flow
cytometric assay that uses a recombinant vaccinia virus expressing
enhanced green fluorescent protein and which would be applicable
to other viruses.]
54. Ober B T, et al., Immunogenicity and safety of defective vac-
cinia virus lister: comparison with modified vaccinia virus Ankara,
["Potent and safe vaccinia virus vectors inducing cell-mediated im-
munity are needed for clinical use. Replicating vaccinia viruses gen-
erally induce strong cell-mediated immunity; however, they may
have severe adverse effects. As a vector for clinical use, we assessed
the defective vaccinia virus system, in which deletion of an essential
gene blocks viral replication, resulting in an infectious virus that
does not multiply in the host. The vaccinia virus Lister/Elstree strain,
used during worldwide smallpox eradication, was chosen as the pa-
rental virus."]
55. Andrew Pollack, Threats And Responses: Biological De-
fenses; Company Says It Will Test A Safer Smallpox Vaccine, New
York Times, December 16, 2002, Section A; Page 16. ["A Califor-
nia biotechnology company said yesterday that it had acquired the
American rights to a Japanese smallpox vaccine it says is safer than
the one the Bush administration plans to use.. .The company, Vax-
Gen, said it hoped to begin clinical trials early next year and to win
approval from the Food and Drug Administration to begin sales in
2004. If the vaccine is approved, the company plans to market it
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A products liability test focused on the prevention of avoidable harm
would argue that if there is a safer design available which would be
effective in creating immunity at less risk to the patient or contacts
of the patient. Here, lower-strength vaccines such as those available
in Japan (but not yet here) would be cited as examples to demon-
strate such an alternative. Although the product-by-product com-
parison approach to design defect litigation has been rejected by
some courts, a majority of the courts that have addressed the issue
embraces such a case by case rule. 56 Failure to develop and deploy
such technology could be deemed unreasonable - and therefore lead
to a verdict on design defect..
It is worth noting that in the United Kingdom tardiness by the Na-
tional Blood Authority into implement an effective screening test for
Hepatitis C with reasonable promptness rendered the blood product
defective. Liability would be imposed in favor of those infected
with the virus after a date determined by the court to have been a
reasonable date for screening program implementation. 57 Claims by
vaccinees or infected contacts against hospitals and public health
commercially, hoping it will appeal to millions of consumers who
want some protection against bioterrorism but fear the side effects of
the existing vaccine."] See also www.vaxgen.com. [last visited
February 16, 2004.]
56. See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Re-
statement of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000),
and George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for
Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-Constrained Market, 49
UCLA L. REV. 737 (2002) (arguing that drugs, vaccines, blood
products, and medical devices are amenable to the alternative safer
design test of product defect embraced by Section 2 of the Products
Liability Restatement, and rejecting the Restatement's Section 6(c)
which rejected such a comparative test, permitting liability findings
only where the sum of the harms done by the product exceed its
benefits for every class of user); but see James A. Henderson, Jr.,
and Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J.
151 (2001) (acknowledging the aptness of testing by alternative de-
signs, but limiting the comparison to products already approved by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and actually available on the
market at the time of sale of the challenged product).
57. See A. and others v. National Blood Authority, Queens Bench
Division, 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B. 2001).
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authorities for failure to employ a new, safer smallpox vaccine once
it becomes available, are possible. However, given the close atten-
tion being paid to the smallpox vaccination program, there is little
chance that a safer alternative would long languish unused.
Another possibility is an action for medical malpractice. An action
against the doctor, health worker, or employing hospital by a co-
worker would, of course, be subject to the workers' compensation
bar. An action by a hospital patient or contact to whom the vaccinia
virus was inadvertently transmitted would be a more likely cause of
action. Failure to follow appropriate precautions such as washing
hands, maintaining protective bandages, or carelessly exposing im-
mune-compromised persons to recently inoculated individuals are all
potentially viable causes of action, grounded on the negligent failure
to adhere to protocols recommended by the CDC and others.5 8 Simi-
larly, actions could be grounded on failure to recognize and effec-
tively treat adverse reactions to smallpox.
Alternatives to Tort Claims
Workers' Compensation as a Remedy
Most persons injured through vaccinia vaccination will not have a
viable cause of action in tort. They will have to look to workers'
compensation laws. Though there are significant state variations,
workers' compensation generally provides benefits for workers who
suffer injury or disease that "arises out of and in the course of their
employment."59 Accordingly, there must be a causal relationship
between employment and disease that is characteristic of the em-
ployment, not simply an unrelated event, which occurs while at work
(such as a seizure, or, for that matter, a terrorist attack). Here, a seri-
58. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, VACCINATION GUIDELINES
FOR STATE AND LOCAL HEALTH AGENCIES, supra note 40 (recom-
mending smallpox/vaccinia vaccination protocols); CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, Smallpox Vaccination and Adverse Reactions:
Guidance for Clinicians,52 No. RR04 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 1 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/PDF/RR/RR5204.pdf (discussing adverse reactions, rec-
ognizing transmission, preventing contract transmission, and avail-
able treatments) (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
59. LARSON'S, supra note 45.
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ous question exists as to whether adverse events associated with vol-
untary vaccinia vaccination "arise" out of employment.
Workers' compensation benefits characteristically include tempo-
rary disability benefits (after a one-week waiting period and subject
to a statutory cap), permanent, partial, or total disability benefits,
medical benefits, and death benefits. 60  The limitations on these
benefits - the quid pro quo of which Professor Larson speaks, are
largely what prompted the Waxman bill, H.R. 865, and the Admini-
stration proposal, to be sponsored by Senator Judd Gregg, which is
discussed below.
As of this writing, there have been few adverse events reported,
and no claims have yet been adjudicated or even made. Only one
case of severe reaction (suspected generalized vaccinia), and 23 non-
serious adverse events (fatigue, headache, fever, chills, myalgia,
nausea) have been reported among the 7,354 civilian public health
and health care workers vaccinated from January 24 to February 21,
2003.61
The AFL-CIO reports that 12 states have confirmed that they will
offer workers' compensation benefits for those who suffer vaccine-
related illnesses. 62 In New Jersey, employers and their insurers
make such decisions on a case-by-case basis, and the Division of
Workers' Compensation does not issue advisory opinions. In New
York, the State Department of Health is preparing a letter from
Commissioner Antonia Novello, affirming her view that workers
who fall ill from vaccinia vaccine will be entitled to workers' com-
pensation benefits. Although her office has consulted with the State
Insurance Fund and the Workers' Compensation Board, they are not
expected to sign or formally endorse the Commissioner's state-
ment.
63
60. See id.
61. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Smallpox Vaccine Adverse Events Among Civil-
ians - United States, February 18-24, 2003, 52 No. 8 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 156 (Feb. 28, 2003).
62. Robert Pear, Threats and Responses: Biological Defense; Of-
ficials Seek Smallpox Compensation Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2003, at A25.
63. Telephone Interview with Christine Hoffman, Senior Attorney
for Bioterrorism Preparedness, New York State Department of
Health (Mar. 7, 2003).
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The difficulty in predicting whether workers' compensation bene-
fits will be available is that occupational diseases such as asbestosis,
and risks like being robbed on the highway while traveling, are in-
herent in certain types of work. Some jobs carry increased risks that
"arise" from the employment itself. Smallpox vaccination is volun-
tary and the adverse effects of the prophylactic measure do not in-
here in the employment in the same way that carpal tunnel syndrome
inheres in the work of seamstresses, or silicosis in the work of gran-
ite cutters and coal miners.64 The New York statute illustrates the
problem:
"Injury" and "personal injury" mean only accidental inju-
ries arising out of and in the course of employment and
such disease or infection as may naturally and unavoid-
ably result.
65
The risk of vaccinia infection does not "naturally and unavoid-
ably '66 result from work as an Emergency Room physician, nurse, or
orderly. The vaccination is a voluntary means of prophylaxis, en-
couraged by the authorities, and perhaps, the employer. The atten-
dant risk of infection is an avoidable risk, taken in anticipation of an
unprecedented event. Clearly, the legislature did not contemplate
such a set of circumstances when it passed the Workman's Compen-
sation Statute. But that, of course, is not the end of the matter. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in another workers' com-
pensation case regarding occupational heart disease claims for which
the statute was similarly unhelpful:
That omission leads us to "the land of mystery," see Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 18
(Yale Univ. Press 1979), where the legislation is silent. In
the absence of specific guidance, our task is to discern the
intent of the Legislature not only from the terms of the
Act, but also from its structure, history and purpose.6
7
64. See DAVID ROSNER & ROBERT MARKOWITZ, DUST AND
DISEASE: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
(1991). See also Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945
(2003) (establishing no-fault scheme of compensation for coal min-
ers' silicosis claims).
65. N.Y. Worker's Compensation §2(7) (2003).
66. Id.
67. Fiore v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 140 N.J. 452 (N.J. 1995)
(citation omitted).
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Reference to other jurisdictions yields mixed results. Professor
Larson observes that
When inoculation is occasioned by the particular condi-
tions of employment, injury resulting from the inocula-
tion should be deemed to have occurred in the course of
employment. If there is an element of actual compulsion
emanating from the employer, the work connection is be-
yond question, as when the company requires the em-
ployee to submit to vaccination by the company's doctor
as soon as the employee is hired, or during an epidemic
tells the workers that unless they are vaccinated they can-
not work until the epidemic is over. By equal logic, just
as an employee on an overseas assignment is entitled to
associate the contraction of malaria or polio or tuberculo-
sis with the nature of the work, so any harm stemming
from inoculations undertaken to protect against the risks
of overseas diseases, whether the inoculations were
strictly required or not, should be viewed as flowing di-
rectly from the employment.
68
Here we find no compulsion to participate in the federal program,
which is entirely voluntary, both for the individual and the institu-
tion. Unlike HIV or hepatitis C (which are blood-borne, and thus
create risks for health workers) or tuberculosis (which is transmitted
by aerosol), smallpox infection is not an inherent risk of employ-
ment, especially since it was globally eradicated, and there is no
quantifiable, or even identifiable risk of bioterrorist attack.
Some courts have ruled in smallpox vaccination cases, with mixed
results. In Connecticut, it was long ago held that an employee's vac-
cine-related injuries would not be compensable under the following
circumstances: 1) where a board of health recommends but does not
direct that the employees of an employer be vaccinated in an effort
to prevent a threatened epidemic, and 2) the employer makes avail-
able the facilities for the vaccination without cost to his employees,
but 3) leaves the choice of whether to be vaccinated up to the indi-
vidual employee. The court reasoned that in such a situation, vacci-
nation is recommended not for the benefit of the employer, but pri-
68. See LARSON'S, supra note 45, at § 27.03 [2] (heading of this
Section is Acts Benefiting the Claimant).
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marily for the benefit and protection of the employee and the public
generally. 69
In Saintsing v. Steinbach Company,7 ° an Asbury Park department
store provided the vaccine free of charge, and "strongly urged" em-
ployees to be vaccinated during a 1947 smallpox scare. Each em-
ployee consented and released the employer from liability. Saintsing
became seriously ill. The New Jersey appellate court found a mutual
benefit, and therefore an employment relationship:
[I]nsofar as it aided in the prevention of smallpox within
the employee group it protected the employer against
possibly disastrous business consequences.. .While his ef-
forts were highly commendable ... it would be unrealistic
to find that they were for the exclusive benefit of the em-
ployees and not additionally designed to further a sound
employer-employee relationship and safeguard the em-
ployer against the serious effects of a case of smallpox
amongst its employees.7'
In King v. J.N. Arthur, 72 the North Carolina court held that where a
board of health compelled dairy employees to submit to periodic
blood tests, the risk of infection or other injury did not arise out of
the employment and the injury was not compensable. 73
In Suniland Toys v. Karns, 74 an employee was vaccinated at em-
ployer expense during work hours after a hurricane contaminated
the local water supply, creating a risk of typhoid fever. The Florida
Supreme Court found the employee's allergic reaction to the vaccine
to be compensable, saying that the vaccination was "of 'benefit' and
'mutually advantageous' to employer [and employee].75 This find-
ing, we think, is necessarily based on the fact that under the particu-
lar circumstances the inoculation was calculated to reduce the risk of
compensable disability. '' 76 The Florida court embraced the mutualbenefit doctrine, and thereby negated the defense that a measure in-
69. See Smith v. The Seamless Rubber Co., 150 A. 110 (Conn.
1930).
70. 64 A.2d 99 (App. Div. 1949), aff'd 66 A. 2d 158 (N.J. 1949).
71. Id.
72. 96 S.E.2d 846 (N.C. 1957).
73. See id.
74. 148 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1963).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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tended for the worker's own benefit does not create a risk arising
from the employment. The facts in Suniland Toys, however, are
distinguishable because an identifiable danger of illness contracted
on the job is present, and thus, avoided by the typhoid vaccination. 77
In City of Littleton v. Schum,78 a fireman was required to be vac-
cinated for hepatitis because a fellow firefighter had developed the
disease. The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the vaccinee's
workers' compensation petition, saying that "exposure to infectious
hepatitis is not indigenous solely to the work of firemen, but exists
equally outside of that employment, as evidenced here by claimant's
advising his doctor that he was exposed at a banquet.,79 It could,
therefore, be argued that potential first responders who are being
vaccinated today simply share in a risk that faces the general public.
Perhaps closest to the mark is City of Austin v. Smith.80 The court
states the issue:
At the time of Smith's alleged injury of October 19, 1976
he was a firefighter employed by the City of Austin. The
injury, so called, was or resulted by reason of a "swine
flu inoculation," the ingredients for which were provided
by the federal government and administered by the city
through its agents and employees.
While receipt of the inoculation was voluntary in that
Smith was at liberty to refuse it, the jury was entitled to
believe that the City desired that he receive it for its own
welfare (in that greater assurance of ability of Smith to
perform the duties of his employment would be pro-
vided). The record shows that Smith desired to receive it
for his individual protection.8'
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, further embraces the Saintsing
decision, relying in part on the following support from a widely-
cited treatise:
Injury through inoculation should be covered "if there
is a combination of strong urging by the employer and
some element of mutual benefit ...." Larson, Workmen's
77. See id.
78. 553 P.2d 399 (Co. App. 1976).
79. Id.
80. 579 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
81. Id.
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Compensation Law § 27.32 (1978), "Inoculations and
employment health tests."
82
The argument favoring compensability seems likely to prevail, de-
spite the voluntary nature of the program, and that it is for the gen-
eral public benefit, rather than the employer's. The inoculation is a
qualification for membership in a smallpox response team, which the
nation's highest public health authorities, acting to protect the gen-
eral welfare, have called upon states, local government, health care
providers, and emergency response forces to undertake. A worker's
response to the urging of his employer to take risks for such pur-
poses is of mutual benefit - to himself, to the employer, and to the
nation. That such an employee is doing his patriotic duty is also a
factor that should not be ignored in the calculus.
Other No-fault Compensation Options
Workers' compensation programs are not the only no-fault com-
pensation schemes that have ever been enacted. In a quasi-elective
system, Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986 (NCVIA), which in turn established the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. 83 In essence, the sys-
tem creates a no-fault administrative remedy that must be exhausted
before a common law tort claim can be brought. Financed by an
excise tax on vaccines, the scheme immunizes manufacturers from
suit, while providing for and assuring compensation to those suffer-
ing injuries caused by childhood vaccines. 8
This compensation scheme recognizes both, the special public in-
terest in a comprehensive program of childhood immunization, and
the essentially involuntary character of the risk of vaccine-related
injury. A century ago, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to compel immuni-
zation of children as a public health measure. 85 In such a mandatory
immunization environment, pressure grew for a system that would
compensate children injured by vaccinations to which they had no
choice but to submit. From a public health standpoint, compensation
was preferable to granting a parental right of refusal, such as had
82. Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 - 300aa-34 (2000).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e).
85. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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been implied by judgments requiring individualized warnings of the
small risk of serious injury. Allowing children to opt out would hin-
der the vaccination program from achieving the degree of compli-
ance critical to disease control and eradication. 86 These concerns
coupled with the alarm of vaccine manufacturers at the unpredict-
ability of the liability awards they faced for claims such as those
arising from injuries ostensibly due to DPT vaccine, led to Congres-
sional action.
87
86. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)
(upholding verdict for child injured by Sabin live virus polio vaccine
whose mother did not receive warning of the risk of vaccine-induced
paralytic polio when child was vaccinated in mass-inoculation pro-
gram).
87. See Reitze, supra note 41 at 193-94. Surveying some of the
DPT cases:
In Holcomb v. United States, No. 79-2376 (S.D. W. Va. Feb.
15, 1982), the plaintiff received a series of DPT shots in army clinics
and then suffered encephalopathy. The parents brought suit against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and against
Richard-Merrell, the vaccine manufacturer. The government settled
for $390,000, Richard-Merrell contributed $210,000. Id.
In Wilson v. United States, No. C80-1325A (N.D. Ga. July 9,
1982), Air Force physicians gave a DPT shot to a child who had se-
vere reactions to previous DPT inoculations. The adverse reaction
left the child permanently, severely retarded. The suit was brought
under the FTCA and the plaintiff agreed to a structured settlement
with a present value of $2,299,948. Id.
In Piefer v. Devitt, No. 590-343 (Mil, Co. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1,
1984), a pediatrician gave a third DPT shot to a child who had ad-
verse reactions to the first and second shots. The plaintiff suffered
febrile reactions and convulsions that left the child mentally re-
tarded, requiring 24 hour [sic] care. A jury awarded the plaintiff
$3.05 million. Id.
In Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987), aff'd
828 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1987), a jury in Boise, Idaho awarded nearly
$1.2 million to the parents of a child who developed transverse mye-
litis, allegedly as a result of a DPT shot. According to the plaintiff's
lawyer, the case turned on whether Lederle's vaccine was as safe as
another vaccine, Tri-Solgen, which was manufactured by Eli Lilly.
Id.
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The NCVIA provides awards for (1) pain and suffering, approving
an award even though the injured person may be incapable of con-
scious suffering but imposing a statutory cap of $250,000 (2) lost
wages or earnings (3) expenses of medical care and necessary diag-
nostic services (4) expenses of required care, therapy, assistance, or
special education (5) expenses for adaptive living or architectural
alterations to the homes of petitioners to enable them to continue
living at home (6) under certain circumstances, premiums for health
insurance (7) a $250,000 death benefit, and (8) attorneys fees and
costs or expenses incurred in the litigation.88 Contested claims are
litigated before a special master of the Court of Federal Claims to
which appeals are taken, and are ultimately subject to review by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
89
It would be a perilous decision for a child (or their parent) to risk
an offer that's only inadequacy is in the amount of pain and suffer-
ing. As a result, the right to file a common law tort action is main-
tained, but there seems to be little vitality in that option given the
efficiency and reliability of the administrative remedy.
The Institute of Medicine, in its letter report on the CDC proposal,
urged that the smallpox vaccination program "clarify" each state's
position on workers' compensation benefits, and that the CDC and
Department of Health and Human Services be "bold and creative" to
bring the "issue of smallpox adverse reactions - including those that
occur despite non-negligent manufacture and administration of the
In Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), the plaintiff suffered irreversible brain damage as a result
of a DPT shot. Since the plaintiff was unable to identify the specific
manufacturer of the vaccine, the suit was brought against five phar-
maceutical companies [that] produced a substantial share of the DPT
vaccine marketed in 1965 on a market share theory of liability. Rul-
ing on a pretrial motion, the court held that, if the plaintiffs proved
causation and could show that one or more of the defendants mar-
keted the drug with conscious disregard for the health of consumers,
then the plaintiffs will be entitled to recover punitive damages from
each defendant. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15.
89. See id. at aa-12.
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vaccine - to speedy resolution." 90 The Waxman Bill, as discussed
below, is a step toward that speedy resolution.
The Waxman Bill - H.R. 865
Representative Henry Waxman has introduced in the 10 8th Con-
gress H.R. 865, the "Smallpox Vaccine Compensation and Safety
Act of 2003." 9' The bill would establish a federally funded, state-
implemented education program:
[T]o provide to each individual to whom a covered coun-
termeasure against smallpox is proposed to be adminis-
tered an explanation of(i) the screening and medical sur-
veillance and evaluation programs available.. .(ii) the risks
and benefits from administration of such countermeasure
for such individuals and those individuals with whom
they have close contact; (iii) the availability of the com-
pensation program [created under the bill]; (iv) the eligi-
bility of the individual to receive health care benefits; (v)
the right of the individual to refuse the administration of
any covered countermeasure against smallpox; (vi) the
right of an individual who [declines to be vaccinated] to
be protected from disciplinary action or wage reduction;
and (vii) the general functions and duties that such indi-
vidual may be expected to carry out if there is a smallpox
outbreak.
Freedom of Choice
H.R. 865 is designed to assure that informed consent is genuinely
informed, that the states are relieved of much of the burden of the
federal program, and that the choice to be vaccinated is truly volun-
tary. These.are rights of individual autonomy which are widely rec-
ognized in the law, but which are likely to be eroded by peer pres-
sure and employer influence without such Congressional support for
their exercise and protection from their violation. It is often said that
we have to sacrifice some of our freedoms for greater security, but
90. IOM Letter Report #1, supra note 27, at 35, Summary of Rec-
ommendations.
91. Smallpox Vaccine Compensation and Safety Act of 2003,
H.R. 865, 108th Cong. (2003).
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surely we should not ask only some to sacrifice their personal free-
doms without ensuring that their choice to do so is fully informed. It
is only right to insist that those whom we ask to subject themselves
to the risk of disease, on our behalf, make genuinely free choices to
do so.
Medical Leave
Workers' compensation laws generally provide wage loss benefits
only if one is out of work one week or more. Filling the gap of 5
days common in workers' compensation laws, H.R. 865 would
amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Family Leave
Act, to provide that a worker "shall be entitled to a total of not more
than 4 workdays of paid leave because of a health condition that
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position
of such employee that arose as a result of the employee having re-
ceived (smallpox vaccine) or come into close contact with (a vacci-
nated) individual." The measure would provide for full pay, and
"shall apply to all employers regardless of size." It is enough to ask
someone to subject herself to the vaccinia live virus vaccine, without
quibbling over the time that is necessary to recover from its adverse
effects, whether mild or severe.
Medical Surveillance and Evaluation Program
H.R. 865 would fund in HHS "an ongoing active medical surveil-
lance and evaluation program [for] all individuals [vaccinated for
smallpox] and [their close contacts]." As the IOM has urged, this is
an active surveillance system, unlike the passive surveillance sys-
tems (e.g. VAERS) currently in place. The 10M, which urges a go-
slow approach to smallpox vaccination, has urged that the CDC "de-
velop and communicate the criteria (i.e. types and rates of adverse
reactions) that would trigger a reconsideration" of the current vacci-
nation plans. The IOM seeks a pause between Phase I (in which
500,000 public health and health care workers would be vaccinated,
and Phase II (in which 10 million health care, public health, and
other emergency response workers would be vaccinated). 92 The ac-
tive surveillance measures of H.R. 865 would provide a firm founda-
tion of data, with which to assess the risks of the much larger Phase
92. See id.
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II vaccination contemplated by the CDC. This is a prudent measure
as we seek to minimize harm, where the benefits are uncertain; bene-
fits could be nonexistent if there is no attack or very great if there is
an attack.
Health Care Benefits
H.R. 865 would reimburse states for providing "such medical care
as may be medically necessary" to any "health care worker or first
responder" who has suffered any adverse reaction or complication,
and to any individual who "has suffered any adverse reaction or
complication as a result of contact with another person who received
(smallpox vaccine)." The bill's benefits are only for medical costs
that are not covered by insurance or contractual reimbursement obli-
gation. Health insurers would be obligated in every group health
plan "to provide coverage of the side effects" of smallpox vaccina-
tion. These measures wisely provide compensation to those who
were neither asked to volunteer to take the risk of vaccination, nor
have the assurance that most workers will have of health insurance
or workers' compensation benefits.
National Smallpox Vaccination Injury Compensation Program
H.R. 865 would amend the Homeland Security Act's exclusive tort
remedy (which extends the protection from liability afforded Public
Health Service officers) 93 by providing that claims for smallpox vac-
cine -related injuries be brought under the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program. 94 Claimants would first have to exhaust the
administrative petition for compensation under the Smallpox Pro-
gram as established by the legislation. The bill would extend the
benefit to those who were injured "as a result of contact" with a per-
son who received the smallpox vaccine. Claimants would be exempt
from the vaccine program's requirement that the claimant prove
death, residual effects for more than 6 months, or in-patient hospi-
talization and surgical intervention. The death benefit would "in-
clude an award for the estate of the deceased of $850,000, in addi-
tion to any other compensation to which the petitioner is entitled."
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2003).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (2000).
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Easing the burden of proof in the manner of the Childhood Vac-
cine Act, the Vaccine Injury Table would be amended by statute to
include a presumption that the common adverse effects and compli-
cations of vaccinia vaccination are causally related to the vaccine
itself. Compensation, however, would be barred for "minor scarring
or minor local reaction." 95 This comprehensive program would in-
corporate into the National Vaccine Compensation Program a new
set of injuries due to a new set of risks undertaken. Though the
number of persons at risk is small, our commitment to those from
whom special commitment is asked (EMT crews, firemen, police-
men, and rescue and recovery workers) is warranted. Their necessity
and selflessness was demonstrated as they rushed towards the towers
and the ruins of Ground Zero, on September 11, 2001; the day that
New York and Washington became the first battlefields of a century
of war anywhere, anytime. Learning from these exemplars of hero-
95. Proposed amendments to Vaccine Injury Table, 42 U.S.C. §
300aa- 14:
Adverse event:
Time period for first symptom or manifestation of onset or of sig-
nificant aggravation after administration of vaccinia virus or other
substance or medication administered for the purpose of preventing
or treating smallpox (including a covered countermeasure against
smallpox):
A. Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock .............................. 0-4 hours
B. Eczema vaccinatum (including in a contact case) ........ any
C. Accidental inoculation (including in a contact case) .... any
D . Progressive vaccinia ..................................................... any
E. Encephalopathy (or encephalitis) .................................. 0-21 days
F. Stevens-Johnsonsyndrome ............................................ 3-21 days
G. Generalized vaccinia .................................................... 0-60 days
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ism, whom must never be forgotten, provides cogent support for re-
form.
The Administration Proposal
After several months of silence, the Bush administration on March
5, 2003 outlined a limited program of compensation. Rather than
incorporate the program into the National Vaccine Injury Program
(NVCIP), the Administration's initiative is modeled on the Public
Service Officers Benefit Act (PSOBA), which provides a death and
total and permanent disability benefit, with a COLA-adjusted cap.9 6
The measure has not yet been introduced in Congress. The ex-
pected sponsor, Senator Judd Gregg (Rep. N.H.), explains that the
benefits would be administered by the Department of Health and
Human Services and be retroactive to cover those who already have
been vaccinated under the program. The four elements of the plan,
according to Senator Gregg,97 include:
Permanent and total disability benefit: HHS would create
a benefit modeled on the PSOBA to offer a $262,100
permanent and total disability benefit for disability
caused by the administration of the vaccine. This benefit
would be paid regardless of other death benefits available
to the individual.
Death benefit: HHS would create a benefit modeled on
the PSOB to offer a $262,100 death benefit for deaths
caused by administration of the vaccine. This benefit
would be paid regardless of other death benefits available
to the individual (except the approximately one-third of
first responders who are already covered by the PSOBA).
Temporary or partial disability benefit: HHS would com-
pensate individuals for two-thirds of lost wages after the
fifth day from work, up to a maximum of $50,000.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2003).
97. Press Release, Judd Gregg, Senator Gregg to Move Smallpox
Compensation Legislation Through Senate (Mar. 6, 2003), available
at http://gregg.senate.gov/press/press030603a.pdf.
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Health care benefit: HHS would compensate individuals
above for their reasonable out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses. This benefit would be secondary to any health
insurance benefit that might be available to the individ-
ual.
Additionally, says Gregg, HHS would compensate third parties
contracting vaccinia from public health and medical response team
workers who have been vaccinated. 98 Attorneys' fees are not in-
cluded in the PSOB program and no mention is made of them in the
Gregg/HHS proposal. It is also noteworthy that there is no award for
permanent partial disability, such as disfiguring scarring due to ec-
zema vaccinatum, or other long-term effects of vaccine-induced vac-
cinia.
The Gregg/HHS proposal is far less generous than the Waxman
bill. The death benefit is much higher in the Waxman measure.
Perhaps more important from a public health point of view, the edu-
cation and surveillance programs provided by H.R. 865 are not men-
tioned in the Gregg/HHS announcements. These elements serve to
minimize the risks we impose on our health care workers, and in-
crease our confidence that a health care worker's choice to be vacci-
nated is really informed and really voluntary. The Gregg/HHS pro-
posal is, nonetheless, a step forward because it marks the entry into
the Congressional majority's and the Administration's discussion.
The Waxman bill, H.R. 865, is a highly desirable set of measures to
address the goals of protecting public health with maximum effec-
tiveness, and at minimum cost in human suffering due to vaccine-
related disease.
IV. POSTSCRIPT: FALSE ALARM? PREPAREDNESS, BIOTERRORISM,
AND ADVERSE EVENT EXPERIENCE AMONG CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
SMALLPOX VACCINEES
Following this papers first presentation, the United States won a
war in Iraq. Before the war began, President Bush advised us that
our defense included "inoculating troops and first responders against
smallpox" and that a "major research and production effort to guard
our people against bioterrorism, called Project Bioshield" had be-
98. Id.
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gun.99 Invoking September 11, 2001, the President asked us to
"imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans -
this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one
canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror
like none we have ever known."'
00
A week later, Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking before the
United Nations Security Council, declared that "Saddam Hussein has
investigated dozens of biological agents, causing diseases such as
gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camel pox and hem-
orrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop small-
pox. The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal
biological agents widely, indiscriminately, into the water supply,
into the air."101 The war, however, has yet to yield evidence of bio-
logical weapons, much less mobile laboratories capable of producing
large amounts of infectious agents, as had been alleged. 1
02
99. Later introduced as H.R. 2122, the Project Bioshield Act of
2003 is described by its sponsor as an act "to enhance research, de-
velopment, procurement, and use of biomedical countermeasures to
respond to public health threats affecting national security to en-
hance research, development, procurement, and use of biomedical
countermeasures to respond to public health threats affecting na-
tional security". H.R. 2122, 108th Cong. (2003).
100. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the
President on Smallpox Vaccination (Dec. 13, 2002) (on file with the
Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
101. Threats and Responses; Powell's Address, Presenting 'Deeply
Troubling' Evidence on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003 at A18.
102. According to Secretary Powell at the UN:
The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are de-
signed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of
months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison
equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have pro-
duced in the years prior to the gulf war. Although Iraq's
mobile production program began in the mid-1990's,
U.N. inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such
programs. Id.
But the speculation was not confirmed. David Kay, the Central In-
telligence Agency's leader in the search for illegal weapons in Iraq
has testified:
2003]
478 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
The short-term impact on the civilian smallpox vaccination pro-
gram has been plain. Despite initial enthusiasm, in which half of
Americans polled said they would get the vaccine if offered,' 0 3 few
civilians stepped forward as the biological warfare threat failed to
materialize, and wide publicity highlighted the cases of those who
suffered illness after inoculation with the Dryvax vaccinia vac-
cine. 1
4
We have not yet found stocks of weapons... With regard
to biological warfare activities, which has been one of our
two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering sig-
nificant information. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996
further compartmentalized its program and focused on
maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be ac-
tivated quickly to surge the production of BW agents...
.We have not yet been able to corroborate the existence
of a mobile BW production effort. Investigation into the
origin of and intended use for the two trailers found in
northern Iraq in April has yielded a number of explana-
tions, including hydrogen, missile propellant, and BW
production, but technical limitations would prevent any
of these processes from being ideally suited to these trail-
ers. That said, nothing we have discovered rules out their
potential use in BW production.
The Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey
Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, the House Comm. on Appropriations, the Subcomm. on De-
fense, and the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Oct. 2, 2003)
(statement of David Kay, Central Intelligence Agency), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public-affairs/speeches/2003/david-kay 100
22003.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
103. See REUTERS HEALTH, GALLOP POLL (Feb. 11, 2003).
104. McNeil, supra note 21 ("President Bush's plan to vaccinate
500,000 health care workers against smallpox is getting off to an
unexpectedly slow start as hundreds of hospitals and thousands of
nurses across the country say that they will not participate.").
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Adverse Event Surveillance and Reporting
The IOM's request for a pause to study adverse effects, after the
first stage of civilian inoculations, was not heeded. 0 5 However,
105. In its first letter report, the IOM had urged a cautious ap-
proach:
Based on the administration's statement that the risk of a
smallpox attack is indeterminate (not zero but currently
assumed to be very low) (White House, 2002), the benefit
of the vaccination program to the public also is not zero
but is assumed to be very low. The benefit to any indi-
vidual might indeed be zero if the individual never en-
counters the smallpox virus. However, in the event of
exposure to smallpox virus, the benefit to individuals
may be very high. Given this profile of high vaccination
risk and likely very low to zero benefit, the administra-
tion's policy to offer vaccination to public health, medi-
cal, and emergency workers must be implemented in a
most prudent and cautious manner.
IOM Letter Report #1, supra note 27, at 5.
Two months later, the IOM was suggesting a pause - though
the inconsistent implementation of the program had prevented the
clean break that had been expected between phase I (first respond-
ers) and phase II (health care and other workers):
Plans for implementation of the vaccination program
have evolved in a way that precludes the firm demarca-
tion between what were initially intended as two distinct
phases or stages of the program. The committee hopes
that this turn of events will not impair efforts to ensure
the safest vaccination program possible, but steps must be
taken to (1) define and progress toward smallpox prepar-
edness, and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of implementa-
tion and the safe use of the vaccine as extensively as the
mandates and realities of the vaccination program will al-
low. Thus, evaluation at the national level might not take
place before the program progresses (although some state
and local jurisdictions may be able to pause for evalua-
tion before expanding their program activities) but at
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skeptical response from hospitals and health workers may have ac-
complished a functional equivalent. Rather than the 500,000 first
responders who were expected to receive inoculation quickly, only
38,062 had been voluntarily vaccinated by August 29, 2003, at
which point the civilian program was nearly at a halt.' °6 While the
10 million health and emergency workers projected to be vaccinated
apparently never will be inoculated, the Department of Defense car-
ried out about 500,000 mandatory vaccinations of troops and mili-
tary healthcare workers.' 0 7 Their experience provides a basis on
which to gauge the risks and wisdom of smallpox vaccination.
Because smallpox vaccination had been universal until 1972, when
civilian vaccination ended, there was a large database available as
vaccinations resumed. Relying extensively on the classic epidemi-
ological reports of Professor J. Michael Lane, who had studied
smallpox vaccination programs for 50 years, the Advisory Commit-
tee on Immunization Policy (ACIP) recommended in June of 2001
that smallpox vaccination need only resume when an actual terrorist
release of the virus was reported. ° 8 Citing the risks of vaccine-
related illness, the ACIP also recommended development of a new,
safer smallpox vaccine.1°9 Reviewing the reported complications
associated with first-time vaccinia vaccination, the ACIP saw the
principal risks to be 1) accidental inoculation (spread from one part
of the vaccinee's body to another, or one person to another)
529.2/million, 2) generalized vaccinia (systemic illness due to the
least should occur simultaneously, to ensure that lessons
are learned from phase I even in the face of a rapid ex-
pansion.
106. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Smallpox Vaccination Program Status by State,
at www.cdc.gov.od/oc/media/spvaccin.htm (last visited Nov. 7,
2003). Through July 31, 2003 38,062 civilians had been vaccinated.
Id. In the month of August only 315 were vaccinated. Id. The civil-
ian total has thus reached only 38,377. Id.
107. See DEP'T OF DEF., DoD Smallpox Vaccination Program
Safety Summary, as of June 25, 2003, at http://www.smallpox.army.
millevent/SPSafetySum.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
108. See ACIP Recommendations, supra note 13, at 18-21 (rec-
ommending vaccination for laboratory and medical workers working
with non-attenuated orthopoxes).
109. See id.
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vaccinia virus) 241.5/million, 3) eczema vaccinatum (skin rashes
among those with eczema history) 38.5/million, 4) progressive vac-
cinia (severe necrosis at the vaccination site) 12.3/million, and 5)
postvaccinial encephalitis 12.3/million. 110 The last two were consid-
ered potentially fatal. 111
The ACIP's assessment was shared by scientists at the FDA, who
urged the development of new, safer vaccines, and addressed the
possibility of regulatory pre-market approvals gained without human
studies of efficacy. Like the ACIP, they relied on the historic work
of Lane and others. Unlike the ACIP, they took note of the rare case
reports of acute pericarditis after smallpox vaccination.'
1 12
As the government moved toward large-scale vaccination, Dr.
Lane himself took a cautious approach." 3 Lane urged that vaccina-
tion should be limited to the "small numbers of first responders and
personnel who might be involved in the investigation and control of
possible smallpox outbreaks" because of the risk of vaccine-
associated disease, because smallpox spreads slowly, and because
vaccination within the first 2 to 3 days of contraction "generally
aborts the disease." ' 14 Following the conventional historical epide-
miology, he identified as major adverse events after vaccination only
postvaccinial central nervous system disease, progressive vaccinia,
eczema vaccinatum, and fetal vaccinia.115 Lane's approach did not
change the Administration's policy - seeking vaccination of millions
- but the concerns he identified can explain the low rate of voluntary
civilian vaccinations.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Steven R. Rosenthal, Michael Merchlinsky, Cynthia Klep-
pinger & Karen L. Goldenthal, Developing New Smallpox Vaccines,
7 Emerging Infectious Diseases 6, 920-24 (Nov.-Dec. 2001).
113. See J. Michael Lane & Joel Goldstein, Evaluation of 21st-
Century Risks of Smallpox Vaccination and Policy Options, 138
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 6, 488-93 (2003).
114. Id.
115. See id.
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Assessing the Recent Civilian and Military Vaccinia (Smallpox)
Vaccination Experience
The civilian rates of life-threatening complications have been low,
compared to historical rates. Historically, generalized vaccinia - the
disease caused by the live virus with which we now inoculate for
smallpox - occurred among first-time vaccinees at the rate of
241/million. To date, only 3 cases have been reported among the
38,000 civilian vaccinees - a rate of only 78/million. There have
been no cases of postvaccinial encephalitis (historically 12/million),
and no cases of eczema vaccinatum (historically 38/million)." 6
These low rates were a surprise since the surveillance has been far
more active than the usual passive Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting
System (VAERS). The 10M had expected that the adverse reaction
rates would be higher than the historical record because vaccination
had ended in 1972 and persons are more susceptible to injury on first
vaccination. Also, immune-compromised persons are a larger frac-
tion of the population than in the past. However, as the 1OM sug-
gested, careful selection (and perhaps, low volunteer rates of self-
selection) might have reduced the rate of adverse effects.' 17
116. For historic rates see ACIP Recommendations, supra note 13,
at 8. For contemporary rates of injury see CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Smallpox
Vaccination and Adverse Reactions: Guidance for Clinicians, 52
No. RRO4 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1 (Feb. 21,
2003).
117. See 10M Letter Report #1, supra note 27.
Although the vaccine to be used in the first two phases of
the program is the same calf lymph-derived vaccine
stored since the 1970s, the host characteristics on a popu-
lation level have changed significantly. First, a high pro-
portion of the population has not been immunized against
smallpox, and there is evidence that primary vaccinees
are more likely to experience serious adverse reactions
compared to those being revaccinated (Lane et al., 1969).
The vaccine also carries significant risks for some mem-
bers of the population-those with various types of im-
mune suppression, such as HIV infection or due to cancer
chemotherapy, those with certain diseases such as eczema
and atopic dermatitis, and close personal contacts of vac-
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From Passive to Active Surveillance
The high degree of public attention given to the program, the con-
cerns of the IOM, and the lobbying pressure of trade unions and oth-
ers may be responsible for the active reporting system adopted by
the CDC. The VAERS is a post-marketing safety surveillance pro-
gram created as an outgrowth of the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA), and is administered by the FDA and
the CDC. The government does not actively survey as part of this
system. Reporting by medical providers is not mandatory. The
FDA explains that "when the event occurs soon after vaccination ...
[d]octors and other vaccine providers are encouraged to report ad-
verse events, whether or not they believe that the vaccination was the
cause. If the VAERS data suggest a possible link between an ad-
verse event and vaccination, the relationship may be further studied
in a controlled fashion." 8 In contrast, the smallpox adverse event
reporting system is pro-active. Doctors and others are given far
more direct advice to report possible vaccine-caused injury. The
CDC has instructed practitioners:
Providers are strongly encouraged to report serious ad-
verse events to VAERS after the administration of the
smallpox vaccine.* VAERS is a passive reporting sys-
tem for safety monitoring of all vaccines licensed in the
United States, and is jointly managed by CDC and FDA.
CDC and FDA will monitor smallpox vaccine-related ad-
cinees who have such contraindications. The U.S. popu-
lation has many more people at high risk for serious ad-
verse reactions now compared to the 1960s, when most
data concerning the safety profile of the vaccine was col-
lected. Furthermore, it is assumed that with rigorous ef-
forts at screening those at risk and with intensive efforts
at educating vaccinees about caring for the vaccination
site, accidental inoculation of high-risk contacts of vac-
cinees can be minimized. However, the actual risks will
only be known after the vaccination program is operative.
Id.
118. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS)
Overview, at http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaers/what.htm (last updated
Apr. 17, 2003).
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verse event reports daily, and will provide enhanced sur-
veillance of adverse events after administration of the
smallpox vaccine. However, adverse events that are
judged to be serious or unexpected and which require
CDC consultation or IND therapies (VIG or cidofovir)
should not be solely reported to VAERS. These cases
should instead be immediately reported by phone to the
appropriate state health department officials and CDC,
who will assist the reporting provider with completion of
a VAERS form. All other smallpox vaccine adverse
events that are serious, but do not require CDC consulta-
tion or administration of IND therapies, should be re-
ported directly to VAERS within 48 hours of recognition.
All other adverse events should be directly reported to
VAERS within 1 week." 19
*phone, fax, and other contact information omitted.
This active system of monitoring and follow-up by CDC produced
a headline-making, and surprising observation - an unexpectedly
high rate of myocarditis/pericarditis and inflammation of the
heart/membrane- 12 conditions which may range in severity from
mild to life threatening. The CDC recorded 10 cases of cardiac ad-
verse events among civilian vaccinees in the period January 24 -
119. Joanne Cono, Christine G. Casey & David M. Bell, Smallpox
Vaccination and Adverse Reactions, 52 No. RR04 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 26 (Feb. 21, 2003); see also, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HOSPITAL SMALLPOX VACCINATION MONITORING SYSTEM
(HSVMS), at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination
/hsvms/index.asp (last modified May 13, 2003). "A voluntary, web-
based component developed to assist hospitals or other vaccine
monitoring sites in real-time monitoring and tracking of healthcare
workers who receive smallpox vaccine. HSVMS can be used to re-
cord the daily assessment of the vaccination site, symptoms reported
by the vaccinee, vaccine take, determination of fitness for duty, and
work days lost." Id.
120. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Update: Adverse Events Following Smallpox
Vaccination - United States, 2003, Previous Civilian Cardiac Ad-
verse Events, 52 No. 13 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
278 (Apr. 4, 2003).
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March 30, 2003.121 Four cases of myocarditis or myoperidcarditis
were reported in civilians aged 32, 45 (2), and 56 years of age.'
22
Historically, pericarditis and myocarditis had not been recognized as
a smallpox-related complication.
During the military vaccination program, through March 31, 2003,
fourteen cases of myocarditis and/or pericarditis were identified
among 250,000 personnel who received smallpox vaccination for the
first time. 123 No cases were reported among revaccinees. 124 Most
surprising was the age of the patients, which ranged from 21 to 33
years. 12 5 Severity ranged from mild to severe (congestive heart fail-
ure), however there were no fatalities. 12
6
The ACIP quickly met and issued an advisory that those with
known heart disease should not be vaccinated. 127 The ACIP found
the data to be "consistent with a causal relation between myocardi-
tis/pericarditis and smallpox vaccination, but no causal association
between the ischemic cardiac events and smallpox vaccination has
been identified." 2 8 Nonetheless, the data was sufficiently alarming
that ACIP urged new precautions. Vaccinees should be "informed
that myopericarditis is a potential complication of receiving small-
pox vaccine."' 129 The ACIP further recommended exclusion from the
program of persons who:
... have known underlying heart disease, with or without
symptoms, or who have three or more known major car-
diac risk factors (i.e. hypertension, diabetes, hypercholes-
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Supplemental Recommendations on Adverse
Events Following Smallpox Vaccine in the Pre-Event Vaccination
Program: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immuni-
zation Practices,52 No. 13 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 282 (Apr. 4, 2003).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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teremia, heart disease at age 50 years in a first degree
relative, and smoking). 130
Myopericarditis (an inflammation of the muscular wall of the heart
and the enveloping pericardium) proved to be the most common of
the serious possible sequellae reported. 13' Determination of whether
the incidence of that illness among adult vaccinees is coincidental or
causally related may be the subject of study and disagreement for
some time. The active monitoring by CDC of vaccine adverse health
effects and its prompt advice to practitioners was an exemplary pre-
cautionary approach by public health authorities who have the bene-
fit of military data. However, the military experience also shows
that the CDC/ACIP continued to underestimate the risk of myoperi-
carditis, and that its exclusions may have been too cautiously stated.
Military surveillance has yielded the most instructive data. Its suc-
cess yields lessons for those concerned with the effectiveness of the
haphazard reporting that characterize the VAERS. The military ex-
perience may also yield lessons for the post-market reporting the
FDA requires of manufacturers of drugs and biologic products.'
32
The military experience is especially valuable because of the large
130. Id.
131. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Adverse Events Associated with Smallpox Vacci-
nation Among Civilians, at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/
spcivil.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2003).
132. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Guidance for Industry, Post-
marketing Adverse Experience Report for Human Drug and Li-
censed Biological Products: Clarification of What to Report, at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/guidelines.htm (Aug. 27, 1997). Biologic
product manufacturers must submit postmarketing safety reports to
the FDA (21 C.F.R. §§ 600.80 - .81). Id. Drug manufacturers,
packers and distributors have postmarket safety reporting responsi-
bilities under 21 C.F.R. § 310.305, 314.80, 314.98 and 600.80. Id.
They are required to report reports of serious and unexpected ad-
verse events from all sources. Id. Postmarketing study reports of ad-
verse experiences must be reported if the applicant/licensee "be-
lieves that there is a reasonable possibility that the drug or biological
product caused the adverse experience." U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., Draft Guidance for Industry, Postmarketing Safety Report-
ing for Human Drug and Biological Products Including Vaccines, at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/guidelines.htm (Mar. 12, 2001).
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number of vaccinees, and the Defense Department's well-conducted
surveillance of health effects. These studies were the careful evalua-
tion of the health effects of smallpox/vaccinia inoculation, for which
the IOM had hoped. The study results, though containing some sur-
prises, were generally reassuring, yielding somewhat lower than his-
torical rates of adverse effects, and illuminating historically under-
appreciated risks, principally cardiac in nature.
The results of the military program have been reported in the Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). The record is
summarized in a report by John D. Grabenstein of the Military Vac-
cine Agency and William Winkenwerder, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs.1 33 They reported that adverse events
were below historical rates, that all patients recovered and returned
to duty, and that mass smallpox vaccinations can be conducted
safely with lower than historically recognized rates of vaccine-
related illness.' 34 The Defense Department's reports in JAMA were
lauded by the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infec-
tious disease for "highlight[ing] the ongoing challenge to clinicians
to be mindful of the old while being vigilant for the new" and for
providing a "model" which "provided the civilian population with
critical information pertaining to an important general public health
issue."'
' 35
Particularly impressive as a model for the study of the health ef-
fects by public health authorities and pharmaceutical manufacturers
is the military surveillance program, which is aided by a powerful
relational database known as the Defense Medical Surveillance Sys-
tem.
This system integrates data from sources worldwide in a
continuously expanding relational database that docu-
ments the military and medical experiences of service
members throughout their careers. The DMSS allows
nearly instantaneous assessments of the morbidity experi-
133. John D. Grabenstein & William Winkenwerder, Jr., US Mili-
tary Smallpox Vaccination Program Experience, 289 JAMA 3278,
3280-81 (2003).
134. See id. at 3280, Table 3.
135. Mary E. Wright & Anthony S. Fauci, Smallpox Immunization
in the 21st Century: The Old and the New, 289 JAMA 3306, 3307-08
(2003).
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ences of service members who share common character-
istics, such as vaccination.'
1 36
The successes of the Department of Defense surveillance of small-
pox vaccination demonstrates the limitations of the ordinary system
for reporting health effects from pharmaceutical and other medical
products. The latter characterized as a passive system in which FDA
marketing approval decisions are "rarely" reversed. 137 Similarly,
like the pro-active CDC surveillance program, the Department of
Defense program is markedly superior to the Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System created by the National Childhood Vaccine Com-
pensation Act (VAERS).138
The system's principal success is the recognition of myopericardi-
tis as a complication of smallpox vaccination in young men who
have not previously been vaccinated for smallpox. Halsell et al. re-
port in JAMA that although vaccinia virus has long been associated
with myopericarditis, "only 1 previous report has described the
pathological characteristics of myopericarditis following smallpox
vaccination." 139 Yet, the authors of the study of the disease's inci-
dence among U.S. military vaccinees revealed the occurrence rate
was 78/million in a 30 day observation period, while the background
rate was only 21.6/million. 4 ° Such result represents a relative risk
for vaccinees of 3.61 times of that which is considered normal. Most
notably, all military myopericarditis cases were:
136. Mark V. Rubertone & John F. Brundage, The Defense Medi-
cal Surveillance System and the Department of Defense Serum Re-
pository: Glimpses of the Future of Public Health Surveillance, 92
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1900 (2002).
137. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TASK FORCE ON
RISK MGMT., Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use - Cre-
ating a Risk Management Framework, May 1999, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/tfrm/riskmanagement.html [hereinafter Man-
aging the Risks].
138. See Weiging Zhou et al., Surveillance for Safety After Immu-
nization: Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) - United
States, 1991-2001, 52 No. ss01 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 1 (Jan. 24, 2003).
139. Jeffrey S. Halsell et al., Myopericarditis Following Smallpox
Vaccination Among Vaccinia-Na've Military Personnel, 289 JAMA
3283, 3287 (2003).
140. See id.
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white (73% of total vaccinees), men (78% of total vac-
cinees), aged 21 years to 33 years (mean age 26.5 years;
59.5% of total vaccinees were 21-25 years), with disease
onset 7 to 19 days post-vaccination.141
These results are remarkable because this markedly elevated rate
of significant heart disease occurred among the young, and presuma-
bly physically fit, male soldiers, sailors, and airmen.
The hypotheses that rates have either been historically under-
reported, or that we have lost the herd immunity to smallpox exist-
ing when the virus was endemic, warrant further study. Other re-
cently released evidence is either equivocal or negative, on the like-
lihood of a causal relationship between smallpox vaccination and
myopericarditis.142 Although the rate of myopericarditis among ci-
vilian vaccinees was higher than in the military (1/1,700 vaccinees
vs. 1/12,000 military vaccinees), 19 of the 21 civilian myopericardi-
tis cases reported through May 9, 2003 were revaccinees (who were
expected to suffer lower rates of injury than first-time vaccinees). 143
The median age was 48 years and 67% had prior histories of heart
attack, angina, or exertional chest pain. 144
Similarly, a recent review of death certificates shows no identifi-
able increase in cardiac deaths following the mass vaccination of
millions of people in New York City in 1947.145 In a mass inocula-
tion program reaching 80% percent of the residents of New York
City, 6.4 million were vaccinated "during April 4 -May 2, 1947
(Figure 1), including an estimated 500,000-1,000,000 persons each
day during the peak 5 days of the vaccination campaign (April 17-
21). The putative high-risk period for cardiac death was an esti-
mated 4-17 days after vaccination, corresponding to the range of
141. Id.
142. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Update: Cardiac-Related Events During the Ci-
vilian Smallpox Vaccination Program - United States, 2003, 52 No.
21 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 492 (May 30, 2003).
143. See id.
144. Seeid.
145. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, Cardiac Deaths After a Mass Smallpox Vaccina-
tion Campaign - New York City, 1947, 52 No. 39 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 933 (Oct. 3, 2003).
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onset dates of cardiac events observed during the 2003 campaign.' 146
No increase in cardiac or all-cause death rates was detected. 47
This data has not rebutted the conclusion of the Smallpox Vaccine
Safety Working Group of the ACIP. That group, the IOM reports,
was asked about causal relationship between smallpox vaccination
and inflammatory cardiac disease. Specific to the myo/pericarditis
cases:
[t]he working group concluded, "DoD data support a risk
for myocarditis after smallpox vaccination that is signifi-
cantly higher than background rate, and suggest that a
causal association is highly likely."'
' 48
The link between myo/pericarditis and the vaccinia vaccine is
more than merely "suspected." It is probable that first-time live-
virus vaccinees are at significant risk of cardiac injury. The IOM
notes that 10 of 12 members of the working group urged "careful
screening" of health workers for cardiac risk factors and "no member
favors beginning phase 2 of the vaccination program."' 149 Similarly,
the National Vaccine Advisory Committee has urged the DHHS Of-
fice of Public Health Emergency Preparedness that "further smallpox
vaccinations, beyond those of public health response and vaccination
teams, should be delayed until a national consensus is developed on
appropriate next steps."'150 The ACIP itself unanimously
approved a draft resolution and later released a final
statement recommending to CDC that it would be "un-
wise to expand beyond its current, pre-event smallpox
vaccination recommendations because of the new and
unanticipated safety concerns, i.e. myo/pericarditis,
whose extent and severity, particularly of long term se-
quellae, are not yet known. Any smallpox vaccination
that occurs should be carried out only within the context
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. COMM. ON SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., Review of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Smallpox Vacci-
nation Program Implementation, Letter Report #4, at http://books.
nap.edu/html/smallpox-vac/letter-report4.pdf (Aug. 12, 2003) [here-
inafter IOM Letter Report #4].
149. Id. at 27-28.
150. Id. at 28, n4.
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of the currently recommended response teams and state
and local response plans, and should be administered ac-
cording to currently recommended vaccination proce-
dures and protocols ... 151
Significant evidence indicates that there may be long-term adverse
consequences for vaccinees who suffered from myocarditis. 52 Al-
though all vaccinees recovered from the inflammatory condition, the
IOM urges that "there is a general need for longer follow-up in some
of the vaccine studies. Particularly there is a need to follow those
who experienced serious adverse events in order to learned long-
term outcomes, especially for those who experienced cardiac
events." 
15 3
The discovery of cardiac complications among military vaccinees
leads one to readily concur with National Institute for Allergy and
Infectious Disease Director Anthony S. Fauci's conclusion that the
effort was a "model for how military and civilian cooperation can
effectively serve the public health of the entire nation." 5 4 There is
151. Id. (citing ACIP, Statement on Smallpox Preparedness and
Vaccination, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/
pdf/acipjun2003.pdf (last visited July 17, 2003)).
152. See IOM Letter Report # 4, supra note 141, at 32.
Research in non-smallpox vaccine settings suggests that
some people who experience myocarditis may develop
long-term sequelae such as left ventricular dysfunction
(Hiroe et al, 1985) and cardiomyopathy (Hayakawa et al,
1984; Das et al, 1985; Drucker and Newburger, 1997).
As of June 20, 2003, two cases of dilated cardiomyopathy
were diagnosed in civilian smallpox vaccinees three
months after vaccination (CDC, 2003n). CDC is now
advising, "Because smallpox vaccination appears to be
associated causally with myocarditis, which can cause
[dilated cardiomyopathy], further evaluation is war-
ranted" (CDC, 2003n). In one study, one fourth of pa-
tients reporting to a major medical center with sympto-
matic dilated cardiomyopathy died within a year, and half
died within five years.
153. Id. at 30.
154. Mary E. Wright & Anthony S. Fauci, Smallpox Immunization
in the 21st Century: The Old and the New, 289 JAMA 3306, 3308
(2003).
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less reason for sanguinity, however, about the conclusions to be
drawn from Drs. Grabenstein and Winkenwerder's finding that
''mass smallpox vaccinations can be conducted safely with very low
rates of serious adverse events" among soldiers. 55 The military data
does not support the conclusion that the civilian campaign was wise.
It appears that we were fortunate to have met with such low public
response. Had many more volunteered, there would likely have been
more vaccine-caused illness. The "healthy worker effect" is a rec-
ognized bias in epidemiological work. 156 Workers are healthier than
the rest of the population. They are better able to resist pathogens.
That may be true in spades for soldiers girding for war. Had more
civilians heeded the government's call, we would doubtless have
experienced substantially higher rates and severity of illness among
those whose age exceeds, and whose fitness levels fall below, those
of the soldiers and sailors who experienced significant rates of car-
diac disease as a result of smallpox vaccination.
"Pre-event vaccination" has proven to cause illness, but the benefit
of this program remains unascertainable. There remains a dearth of
evidence to support the alarms our leaders sounded. We must con-
sider that one effect of 9/11 is an excess of fear. Ordinary prudence,
one may argue, dictates that where harm is certain and the benefit
unknowable, one should keep risk to an absolute minimum.
We currently have a substantial corps of military medical person-
nel who have been vaccinated, and teams of health professionals
who have successfully carried out a mass immunization. This large
cadre is now immune from smallpox. In the event of an actual use
of the smallpox virus by criminal elements, these military personnel
are available as key responders for our defense. If we carefully mar-
shal and identify our human resources, they can lead and implement
the measures necessary to deal with an outbreak of the disease of
smallpox - a virus existing in secure and controlled environments
accessible only to a small number of authorized personnel. Thus, it
155. See supra, note 123.
156. See CHARLES H. HENNEKENS & JULIE E. BURING,
EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 160 (Sherry L. Mayrent ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1987). "[P]eople who are employed are, on average,
healthier than those who are not.. .The effect of this phenomenon,
termed the 'healthy worker effect' is that any excess risk associated
with a particular occupation will again tend to be underestimate by a
comparison with the general population." Id.
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is time to put an end to the current vaccinia vaccination program.
Such conclusions are firmly supported by the most recent report of
the Institute of Medicine.
Lessons of the Smallpox Vaccination Program
As few civilians were vaccinated recently, few became ill. The
rates of vaccine-related injury in the past had been stated in cases per
million, because vaccination was the norm and because in case of
outbreaks - such as in New York City in 1947 - millions had been
vaccinated in emergency campaigns. There will be no such statistics
for the vaccinia vaccine epidemic, and few claims filed under the
Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003,157 enacted
April 30, 2003, after a short but intense pre-war debate. 1
58
The IOM has voiced the need for a broad view of the issue of pre-
paredness for microbial outbreaks. SARS, the anthrax attacks, and
the fear of more incidents of bio-terror lead the IOM to the conclu-
sion that our goal should be to "protect against acts of bioterrorism
and improve the U.S. public health response to all microbial
threats."'' 59 Vaccination, the IOM observes, is "only one component
of smallpox preparedness" and smallpox preparedness is only one
component of overall public health preparedness.' 60 In the IOM's
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 239a-h (2003).
158. The Republicans decided to suspend the rules and offer for
approval H.R. 1463, the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection
Act of 2003, as a proposed amendment to the Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 202. See 149 CONG. REC. 51, H2476-78 (daily ed.
Mar. 31, 2003). As this proposal was presented under a rule used for
non-controversial measures requiring 2/3 approval, a short but sharp
debate ensued - principally over the failure to guarantee funding and
the inadequacy of compensation asserted by organizations of health
workers, public employee unions, and the American Public Health
Association. The opposition cited inadequate funding and the as-
serted inadequacy of the proposed terms of compensation. In the
face of this opposition, the proceedings were postponed. See 149
CONG. REc. H2476 -94 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2003). One month later,
a substantially similar bill, HR 1770, was enacted. 149 CONG. REC.
62, H3448 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2003).
159. IOM Letter Report #4, supra note 141.
160. Id.
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view, preparedness begins with the identification and training of key
responders - public health teams equipped to respond quickly in a
crisis, and ready to take measures, such as mass vaccination and
education to protect the public.' 61
Rather than the attention to numerical goals that initially character-
ized CDC efforts, defining a "baseline level or minimum standard of
preparedness" is a key task of the CDC as a national leader in pre-
paredness planning. 62 As the IOM urges, we should seek to mini-
mize the number of people vaccinated. 163 The Virginia Common-
wealth University Health System is offered as a model of an ap-
proach to preparedness without vaccination. 164
161. See id. at 2-3.
The national smallpox vaccination program may well be
the first disease-specific test of implementing public
health preparedness in a systematic and comprehensive
manner, and with some public visibility. The smallpox
vaccination program has taken the notion of preparedness
beyond the realm of public health professionals and aca-
demics and has brought it to the attention of a broader
audience of health care workers, emergency responders,
and even the general public.
Implementing the smallpox vaccination program, how-
ever, has also highlighted the need to integrate smallpox
preparedness into readiness to respond to a vast range of
public health challenges, including bioterror agents and
other weapons of mass destruction, emerging or reemerg-
ing infectious diseases, natural disasters, and the insidi-
ous and growing threat of chronic diseases and their pre-
disposing conditions (e.g., obesity). Smallpox is just one
of a multitude of actual and potential threats to the pub-
lic's health. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 5.
Attaining a high level of preparedness may well be possi-
ble without vaccinating any personnel pre-event. For ex-
ample, Virginia Commonwealth University Health Sys-
tem, that presented its hospital preparedness plans to the
committee at the May 1, 2003 meeting, has chosen not to
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A day may come when mass vaccination will be warranted.
Rather than simply prepare for one form of outbreak - smallpox -
vaccination clinics should be established to "distribute other vac-
cines or countermeasures, and provide other services in response to
an outbreak or other threat."' 165 Members of the general public who
seek vaccination should be steered into controlled studies, perhaps as
part of clinical trials for the safer vaccines that the FDA has urged be
developed. 1
66
The IOM's broad approach to preparedness integrates quite
smoothly the horrific jolt of 9/11, the vulnerability which the anthrax
assailant exploited, the rapid international spread of SARS, and the
experience of the civilian and military smallpox vaccination pro-
grams. Its level-headedness and practicality make their contribution
a particularly welcome addition to the discussion.
The Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003
The legislative majority prevailed in the end. Rather than the pro-
posals of Reps. Henry Waxman and Lois Capps (a public health
nurse before entering Congress), which would track the National
have health care workers vaccinated pre-event (Edmond,
2003). The health system's decision was based on con-
siderations of hospital patient safety. Although no vacci-
nated teams of responders were formed, a policy on
smallpox vaccination was developed, with plans to revisit
the policy as needed. Furthermore, a working group on
smallpox preparedness was established, facilities were
modified in accordance with requirements for treating
smallpox victims, training on smallpox diagnosis, treat-
ment, and infection control measures was conducted, and
plans were put in place to rapidly vaccinate hospital staff
in a post-event scenario. The committee believes that
Virginia Commonwealth University Health System's
smallpox preparedness activities provide a good example
of how an organization or jurisdiction can be well-
prepared to respond to a smallpox attack without neces-
sarily having workers vaccinated pre-event. Id.
165. Id. at 10.
166. See id. at 17.
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Vaccine Injury Compensation Act and 167 add smallpox-vaccine re-
lated injury to those injuries due compensation,' 68 the final admini-
stration bill, H.R. 1770,169 tracks the Public Safety Officers Benefit
program administered by the Department of Justice. 70 This Act is
far less generous in compensation than the Vaccine Injury Act, and-
remarkably, bars judicial review by any court of the Secretary of
Health's actions.
H.R. 1770 covers volunteers and their contacts for vaccinations
carried out under the Secretary of Health's Declaration Regarding
Administration of Smallpox Countermeasures.' 7' Benefits, which
are secondary to any other coverage, are to be determined based on a
smallpox vaccine injury table, which will define the class of "ad-
verse effects ... that shall be presumed to the administration of (or
exposure to) a smallpox vaccine, and the time period" in which
symptoms "must manifest in order for the presumption to apply."'
' 72
Claims under the Act are administered by the Secretary of Health,
whose determinations "[n]o court of the United States ... shall have
subject matter jurisdiction to review., 173 The statute of limitation is
one year from administration for persons receiving the vaccine, and
two years from the date of the first symptom in the case of accidental
inoculation. 1
74
The benefits are limited. No provision is made for pain and suffer-
ing, unlike the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation
program, which provides for non-economic damages of up to
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa (2000).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 239 (2003).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2003) (providing supplemental benefits in
case of death or permanent and total disability of a public safety of-
ficer due to personal injuries sustained in the line of duty).
171. Declaration Regarding Administration of Smallpox Counter-
measures, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 68 Fed.Reg. 4212
(Jan. 28, 2003).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 239b(a)(1). A retroactivity provision permits
claims to be filed within one year of addition of an adverse effect to
the table for vaccinees, and within two years for persons accidentally
inoculated. See 42 U.S.C. § 239b(a)(2).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 239a(f)(2).
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 239a(d).
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$250,000. 175 Medical benefits are secondary to all other cover-
ages, 176 wage loss is compensated at 66 2/3% of "loss of employ-
ment income," but is limited to $50,000 pei year, capped by the
amount payable under the Public Safety Officers Benefit Program, 177
except in the case of permanent and total disability. Wage loss bene-
fits under the Act cease at age 65.178 A death benefit is provided,
tracking that of the PSOB program, which is adjusted yearly. Any
payments for lost income are deducted from the death benefit.' 79
The volunteers were so few, and those injured correspondingly
few, that the inadequacies of the compensation program are unlikely
to affect many. The most troubling aspects of the Smallpox Emer-
gency Personnel Protection Act may also never be challenged. The
two most troubling aspects being the exclusion of Secretary of
Health and Human Services determinations from judicial review,
and a statute of limitation incapable of relaxation even where vac-
cine related problems do not manifest themselves in vaccinees until
more than one year after administration, a distinct possibility in the
IOM's view.
V. CONCLUSION
As the IOM concludes, smallpox is not the only threat to the na-
tion's public health and vaccination is not our only defense. We
were driven to implement the smallpox vaccination program by a
uniquely prompted sense of alarm. Regardless of whether the pro-
gram was justified in hindsight - and there appears to be little sup-
175. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 239c.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2003).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 239d. These benefits too are secondary to all
other benefits and may be paid in a lump sum or over "multiple
years." Cf NCVIA, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (affording compensation
for all "actual and anticipated loss of earnings determined in accor-
dance with generally recognized actuarial principles and projec-
tions").
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2003); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) Program, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/PSOBProgram.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 7, 2003) (setting benefit limit at $262,100).
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port for justification - we have learned much from the civilian and
military campaigns. A broad approach to preparedness can yield
broad public health advances against natural and intentional out-
breaks of disease. Active surveillance and streamlined, active data
collection (like that of the Defense Medical Surveillance System)
may reveal benefits in observing previously unsuspected health ef-
fects.
Cautious approaches to potentially dangerous mass vaccination
programs, attention to prioritizing research goals, and emphasis on
preparedness against all forms of microbial threats can increase the
public's sense of security and accordingly improve public health. In
the event that we enlist citizens in essentially experimental defensive
efforts such as the smallpox vaccination program, we should not
limit the nature of compensation afforded, nor should the usual right
of judicial review to those seeking such compensation be denied.
